

THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS  
MEMORIAL FOUNDATION

THE Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago have been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation" on January 27, 1923. The letter of gift contains the following statement:

It is apparent that a knowledge of world-affairs was never of more importance to Americans than today. The spirit of distrust which pervades the Old World is not without its effect upon our own country. How to combat this disintegrating tendency is a problem worthy of the most serious thought. Perhaps one of the best methods is the promotion of a better understanding of other nations through wisely directed educational effort.

The purpose of the foundation shall be the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion.

Annual Institutes have been held at the University of Chicago since the summer of 1924. This series of volumes includes the lectures there delivered, in essentially their original form.

# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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LECTURES ON THE HARRIS FOUNDATION 1939

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# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

*By*

EDUARD BENEŠ

*Formerly President of Czechoslovakia*

*Visiting Professor on the Walgreen Foundation*

*The University of Chicago*

ARTHUR FEILER

*New School for Social Research*

RUSHTON COULBORN

*Atlanta University*

WALTER H. C. LAVES, *Editor*



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## PREFACE

The lectures which comprise this volume were delivered under the auspices of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation. Unlike some previous institutes which have dealt with specific issues of international relations or concerned themselves with geographic areas of special importance in international affairs, the Fifteenth Institute, held at the University of Chicago from July 5 to July 10, 1939, centered about the more general topic of international security and provided an opportunity to examine this subject in detail for the period 1920-39. The public lectures given during this Institute are here reproduced substantially as they were delivered. As the dates of the Institute indicate, these lectures were given before the crisis of August, 1939. Their survey of the period under discussion provides an invaluable background for the events which finally led to war. In addition to these lectures, there were ten round-table discussions devoted to an intensive examination of the record of the post-war security system.

The Institute was especially fortunate in having as one of its guests Dr. Eduard Beneš, former president of Czechoslovakia and now a member of the

## PREFACE

faculty of the University of Chicago. Through his intimate association with the diplomacy of post-war Europe, he was able to provide many new insights into the history of the subject under discussion.

Dr. Beneš' lectures dealt with the problems of security which arose in the negotiations over the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, and the Locarno treaties. His narrative shows both the consistencies and the inconsistencies of policy of the great powers and the gradual emergence of the essential elements in an international peace system: arbitration, disarmament, security. Taken together the three lectures give an interpretation of the negotiations of the twenty years and provide a perspective for a better understanding of the events of recent months.

The other two lectures were given by Professor Rushton Coulborn, formerly member of the staff at Sussex House, and now professor of history at Atlanta University, and Dr. Arthur Feiler, former leading economic writer of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and now on the graduate staff of the New School for Social Research. They present appraisals of the part played by Great Britain and Germany, respectively, in the system of post-World War European diplomacy.

The complete program of the Institute follows:

## PREFACE

### PUBLIC LECTURES

(Leon Mandel Hall)

- I. Wednesday, July 5, 8:30 P.M.—“The Geneva Protocol,” DR. EDUARD BENEŠ
- II. Thursday, July 6, 4:30 P.M.—“The Locarno Pact,” DR. EDUARD BENEŠ
- III. Friday, July 7, 4:30 P.M.—“A Farewell to Leadership: Britain and the World, 1919-39,” DR. RUSHTON COUL-BORN
- IV. Saturday, July 8, 4:30 P.M.—“A Farewell to Security: Germany and the World, 1919-39,” DR. ARTHUR FEILER
- V. Monday, July 10, 4:30 P.M.—“Conclusions on the Problem of Collective Security,” DR. EDUARD BENEŠ

### ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCES

(Judson Court)

WALTER H. C. LAVES, *Chairman*

- I. Wednesday, July 5, 4:30 P.M.—QUINCY WRIGHT,  
*Leader:* “Collective Security from 1920 to 1923”
- II. Thursday, July 6, 10:00 A.M.—DR. EDUARD BENEŠ,  
*Leader:* “The Geneva Protocol”
- III. Thursday, July 6, 7:30 P.M.—DR. EDUARD BENEŠ,  
*Leader:* “The Locarno Pact”
- IV. Friday, July 7, 10:00 A.M.—DR. EDUARD BENEŠ,  
*Leader:* “The Briand-Stresemann Period”
- V. Friday, July 7, 7:30 P.M.—KENNETH W. COLEGROVE,  
*Leader:* “Manchuria-Manchukuo”
- VI. Saturday, July 8, 10:00 A.M.—ARTHUR SWEETSER,  
*Leader:* “Ethiopia”

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- VII. Saturday, July 8, 7:30 P.M.—BERNADOTTE SCHMITT,  
*Leader*: “The Reoccupation of the Rhineland, March,  
1936”
- VIII. Sunday, July 9, 10:00 A.M.—RUSHTON COULBORN,  
*Leader*: “Munich”
- IX. Sunday, July 9, 7:30 P.M.—ARTHUR FEILER, *Leader*:  
“Post-war Attempts at International Economic Security”
- X. Monday, July 10, 10:00 A.M.—DENNA F. FLEMING,  
*Leader*: “The United States and Collective Security”

WALTER H. C. LAVES, *Editor*

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
September 1939

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THE PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE  
SECURITY IN EUROPEAN  
POST-WAR POLICY

*By EDUARD BENEŠ*



## I. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

FRANCO-BRITISH SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS  
1919-23

The greatest thinkers of ancient, medieval, and modern times have given much thought to ways of convincing states and governments of the possibility of originating systems based upon lasting peace and the universal solidarity of mankind. Speaking only of the most prominent, I would mention Aristotle and Plato, Dante Alighieri, Grotius, J. J. Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, all of whom strove for the ideas underlying the modern efforts of the League of Nations.

Innumerable practical political leaders in the past, from George of Podebrad, king of Bohemia, and Henry IV of France to President Wilson, made one effort after another for the establishment of a world-peace organization. Beginning with the year 1848, European parliaments were concerned time and again with the problem of disarmament. From the beginning of the present century most of the important leaders of Europe and America strove for all that which the League of Nations has been attempting since 1919. The question of lasting peace and the question of security for the existence, integrity, and independence of states is and was the

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everlasting problem of all ages, of all rulers, and of all states and nations.

The problem of post-war European and world-security arose immediately upon the opening of the peace proceedings in Paris in 1919. The representatives of France demanded that political and military provisions should be included in the peace treaties which would prevent France from being the victim of attack by foreign troops—a thing which had happened three times within the preceding century. Several plans appeared by which the security of France might be assured. Some thought of the separation of the left bank of the Rhine from Germany and the occupation of certain points of the right bank so that this natural boundary would be fortified. Others demanded a longer occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, together with a permanent neutralization of the left and right banks.

After prolonged discussions between President Wilson, Lloyd George, and Premier Clemenceau, the statesmen in Paris on March 14, 1919, produced the so-called three-power security pact between France, Great Britain, and the United States. This pact was to guarantee to France the help of Britain and the United States in case she was attacked by Germany without provocation. The proposal signed by Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau on June 28, 1919, was the result of a

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compromise in which the French representatives gave up a number of the demands mentioned above in regard to the right and left banks of the Rhine.

It must be emphasized that from the very first discussion of this security pact, the British government recognized the justification of the French demands. Lloyd George pledged himself to endeavor to make the three-power pact a reality; and, when the three-power pact failed, he and his successors admitted that Great Britain, in view of the circumstances which led to the consideration of the pact, was morally bound to give France guarantees of security. If I am rightly informed, Bonar Law and Prime Minister Baldwin took this stand; in negotiations on reparations with Premier Herriot this attitude was again confirmed by Ramsay MacDonald and by Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain. Chamberlain declared expressly on February 2, 1925: "The demand of France for guarantees of security is justified; so long as she does not get them, England will do nothing that would mean that she forgets their mutual partnership in the last war."

So it happened that the question of a security pact regularly reappeared in the Franco-British negotiations. The year 1920 was almost entirely taken up with negotiations on reparations, but in 1921, after the coming to power of Briand, discussions for a new security pact began between him

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and Prime Minister Lloyd George. The question was concretely put in January, 1922, at the conference in Cannes, when Lloyd George tried to solve a number of reparations questions. Having agreed with Premier Briand on a united policy toward Russia, Lloyd George on January 11, 1922, gave Briand a proposal for a new security pact, according to which Great Britain was to give guarantees of aid to France and Belgium in case of an attack by Germany. It was also decided at Cannes to call the well-known first post-war European conference at Genoa.

In Paris in important political circles this proposal was not considered satisfactory. This opposition led to Briand's resignation and to the appointment of Poincaré as premier. Premier Poincaré defined more precisely and strengthened the demands of France; he wanted particularly to prolong the time clause of the pact proposed by Lloyd George at Cannes and to supplement it with a military convention. These negotiations failed. This probably drove Lloyd George to try to extend the question of security to all of Europe, for he came to the Genoa conference with a new proposal for an all-European security pact, known as the "pact of nonaggression."

This pact, consisting of two general articles, simply expresses the obligation that each state will refrain from attacking the boundaries of another

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state—the same obligation which is expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was rejected by a great majority of those present at the Genoa conference after an attempt on the part of some to supplement and perfect it.

The discord which resulted from the conference in Genoa and from the stand of Poincaré in refusing to consider the proposals of Lloyd George brought the Franco-British discussions of security to a temporary standstill in July, 1922. In the summer of the following year the London cabinet made a new attempt to discuss the question together with reparations, but Premier Poincaré refused to connect the two questions. The tension which resulted from the occupation of the Ruhr likewise made the Franco-British negotiations more difficult and led to their postponement during 1923.

When, after the elections in England, the cabinet of Ramsay MacDonald was formed in January, 1924, and, Herriot took the reins in France in May of the same year, the question of reparations was the first which faced both these political leaders. When Herriot put into his discussions the question of security, he was assured by Ramsay MacDonald that Britain considered herself bound on the subject of a security pact and that therefore she would come to discuss it with France as soon as possible. That was the point which the negotiations between the two states reached in July, 1924.

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## THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON SECURITY, 1921-23 THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

But in the meantime, parallel with these bilateral discussions of Britain and France, the League of Nations began to discuss the question of security in connection with the question of disarmament. The starting-point was the provision of Article 8 of the Covenant which contains this obligation of the members of the League: "The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armament, to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

The wording of this article indicates, perhaps vaguely yet correctly, that the problem of disarmament is a complex one and that it is necessary to protect the security of the members of the League by permitting the retention of the smallest necessary number of soldiers, by assuring co-operation of all nations, and by creating an organization for peace in which everyone would help respect common international obligations. The first Assembly of the League in 1920, considering the problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments, according to Article 8 of the Covenant, drew up a program and a course of action for this work.

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These first efforts undertaken in the League revealed the complexity of the question, so that the second Assembly of the League in 1921 had to limit its resolutions to questions which were important but secondary—namely, questions in regard to the sale and purchase of arms, the private manufacture of arms, and the question of limiting military expenditures and budgets. As far as the main question was concerned—the reduction of armaments—the assembly limited itself to requesting the preparation of an exact plan by which a gradual reduction and limitation was to be arrived at. In the discussions the great majority of states showed a truly sincere effort to solve wisely the problem of armaments limitation.

As a result of this disposition, there arose, in the Assembly of the League in 1922, a thorough discussion of the conditions by which the reduction and limitation of armaments could be practically arrived at. The result of this discussion was the well-known so-called "Fourteenth Resolution," which, after a long controversy between France and Britain, formulated clearly the principle that, under present conditions, reduction and limitation of armaments is possible only if it is supplemented by a guarantee of security to all those who, having disarmed, might be attacked. In other words, Article 8 of the Covenant of the League received a correct explanation, to the effect (*a*) that states are

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mutually obliged to reduce and limit armaments and (b) that they are bound mutually to aid one another if, after reducing and limiting armaments, one of them is attacked. The voting of this resolution in the League was a great political event because it definitely and inseparably united the two principles of security and disarmament.

The World War, even after peace was concluded, left a legacy of discontent and uncertainty. In various states dissatisfied elements attempted to overthrow the new order of things. Revolutionary movements in Europe and conditions in Russia gave support to these efforts. For this reason, increases in military and safety measures were made in a number of states which were simply trying to acquire security for themselves against the repeated efforts from right and left to provoke a revolt.

Since the former enemies (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria) were compelled to accept the obligation of almost total disarmament by the peace treaties and since some of the Allied and neutral states did not altogether agree with fears concerning the uncertain situation in Europe, an extraordinary international situation arose. Several new groups of states were formed:

1 a) The states bound by the peace treaties to disarm and which actually disarmed, though not to the extent specified by the peace treaties.

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- b)* The former neutral states, the majority of which had no great armies at their command before the war or after.
- c)* The Anglo-Saxon states (England and America) which, after peace was concluded, disarmed to a great extent on land and which at the Washington Conference made an attempt to limit armament on the sea.
- d)* France, the new states, and Russia, which seemed to be compelled by the extraordinary conditions on the Continent to keep up a strong army or to establish one.

As a result of this general situation, serious political controversies developed in Europe. It was pointed out that France was the most powerful military force in Europe and that, with her allies, she could militarily conquer all. In the former enemy states and in the neutral states, in England and in America, agitation arose against those states, accusing them of imperialism and militarism.

These controversies, however, increased the demand for peace all over the world. These demands found strong expression in various international associations and societies, in the women's movement, in the socialist parties, in the well-known interparliamentary union, in associations for the support of the League of Nations, and in the League of Nations itself.

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The Assembly of the League of Nations in the years 1920, 1921, and 1922 was constantly subjected to pressure from this peace movement. Delegations from the first three groups of states mentioned above made earnest efforts in the September meeting each year to see that something definite was accomplished in reduction and limitation of armaments. This brought on very important and decisive conflicts between the French and British, the former emphasizing the impossibility of disarming because of the uncertain international situation and the latter demanding the quickest possible carrying-out of Article 8 of the Covenant.

Debates upon the subject of disarmament soon became prominent. The so-called purely pacifist opinion simply demanded that there should be an immediate but gradual limitation of armaments in the manner attempted at the naval disarmament conference in Washington. The argument was very simple: if all disarm, or, at least limit armaments as much as possible, there will not be arms to fight with, and, therefore, there will be no wars.

This opinion, because of the excessive simplification of the problem, could not be accepted. What would happen if some states carried out their pledge to reduce and limit armaments and others secretly continued to arm? The states which were

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honest and peace-loving would become the victims of the attacks of criminal governments!

This brought about a conflict in the Assembly of the League in September, 1922. The result was a compromise between the French and British: the already mentioned Fourteenth Resolution. In it a definite stand was taken, which became the official one of the League and of all states represented in the League: namely, that reduction and limitation of armaments is possible only on condition that security guarantees will be created for the defense of those who reduce and limit armaments.

After a long discussion in Geneva during the year 1922-23 concerning the so-called security pact, motions for such a system were finally introduced in the League by the British and French delegations. These led to the well-known plans of Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel Requin, which were considered in the committees of the League in their final form in September, 1923, under the name "The Treaty of Mutual Assistance." I was on the committee and was the reporter on this proposal in the plenary session of the Assembly. It was an attempt to insure general European security on the basis of these principles:

- a)* It would reduce and limit armaments and provide supervisory inspection.
- b)* States would pledge themselves to aid an attacked state. In addition, the necessity of regional

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treaties and alliances would be recognized as the chief means of giving aid.

*c)* It would admit, to a certain extent, different degrees of responsibility for separate continents in adhering to the treaty and in carrying it out.

*d)* The entire functioning of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance would be placed under the control of the League of Nations.

### THE REJECTION OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND THE ORIGIN OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

The Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was placed before the individual governments, met with agreement, in principle, in eighteen states, yet aroused considerable fears and objections in others. It was pointed out that, while this security pact was to make effective Article 8 of the Covenant and the Covenant itself (and although it strongly emphasized the military character of the guarantees of security), it did not fix precisely enough the reduction of armaments. According to the opinions of some states, conflict could arise more readily here with the spirit of the Covenant because the security pact placed considerable power into the hands of the individual governments. Some governments also pointed out the necessity for peace provisions: the establishment of neutral zones, the extension of the activity of the

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international courts of justice and of arbitration, etc., all of which the security pact omitted. The recognition of special regional alliance treaties also aroused objections. Some governments thought that it would create groups of powers aimed against other powers or groups of powers and would thus increase political tension.

The most important criticism of all was found in the answer of the British government under Premier MacDonald. This was a severe criticism and in substance a refusal: it rejected the principle of special regional treaties which were the basis of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and asked the substitution of a general pact in its place, favored the demilitarization of dangerous boundary zones, and decisively emphasized the principle of arbitration. Because of these objections and criticisms, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was dropped, and new negotiations were taken up in the Assembly of the League in September, 1924, which led to the adoption of the "Geneva Protocol."

These negotiations are well known. I was delegated by a subcommittee of the League to formulate for discussion a new general proposal which would meet all the British objections and the amendments of other states, members and non-members of the League of Nations.

According to the Fourteenth Resolution, the reduction and limitation of armaments was to be

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supplemented by a system of security guarantees. That meant, however, that all the states in the League had to sign a great treaty of defense, allying all members of the League with any state which some other state would attack. That, however, was a very serious and far-reaching demand. Some states are almost entirely out of danger of military conflicts with their neighbors, others are in great danger, and others, finally, in more or less probable danger. Some states follow a wise policy which does not incite conflicts; others seem never to be free of conflicts, not by any fault of their own, but because the geographical, social, cultural, or economic situation places them in a particularly difficult position. This clearly shows that the sacrifices demanded and made by various states vary.

There arose a further need: if states in a less favorable situation, more exposed to conflicts, demand eventual aid and the accompanying great sacrifices, the aiding states must demand a moral and legal guarantee of a wise and peace-loving policy from the states they are eventually to help. This could be accomplished only by having the states signing such a security pact agree to submit every international conflict unconditionally for peaceful settlement to an international tribunal.

However, the acceptance of this new principle of arbitration immediately gave the proponents of the

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guarantee pact a new and strong argument. What happens when states which have accepted the arbitration obligation refuse to abide by it, or, having acceded to the court's jurisdiction, refuse to carry out the judgment made against them? There is need, in such a case, of an executive power in the form of security guarantees or so-called sanctions, that is, penal measures which would provide for the fulfilment of the prescribed obligations and the authority of the international court.

✓ In this way, by the discussion and the political struggle in the League in 1923 and 1924, three great principles of the international European policy were inseparably united: the reduction and limitation of armaments, the creation of general security guarantees, and the organization of international arbitration. The slogan was: "Arbitration—Security—Disarmament."

The whole problem reached this stage in the first week of the Assembly of the League of Nations of 1924. The French and British prime ministers were present at this discussion. After a lively enough debate, the conclusions mentioned just now were arrived at, after which expression was given to a special resolution, ordering the Assembly to try to solve the entire complex of these questions.

✓ The third committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations commissioned me to prepare

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the proposed text which would systematically formulate these questions in one document. I prepared the whole scheme in general form, formulating in detail only the section dealing with the problem of mutual aid and disarmament. The first committee of the League of Nations was charged to draft, under the guidance of the Greek minister, Nicolas Politis, the section on arbitration. This then became, in its essential part, the so-called "Geneva Protocol."

✓ The Geneva Protocol was a new and more adequate security pact. The form of a security treaty was replaced by the form of a protocol, simply supplementing the provisions of the Covenant. Many delegates in Geneva rightfully demonstrated that the Covenant of the League of Nations was in itself such an important and significant document that it contained everything in embryo: the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, a guarantee of security, and finally even the principles of reduction and limitation of armaments. It was enough, therefore, to add only where gaps were left, to give a new interpretation to those articles of the Covenant where necessary, and to increase the importance of those whose text was adequate. Yet, there was needed a new emphasis so that this revision of the Covenant could satisfy all. The British prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, also took this stand in his speech.

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## WHAT THE GENEVA PROTOCOL MEANT

The main principle of the Protocol was the prohibition of an aggressive war and of war in general. The sovereign right of the states to wage war against one another was limited by the Covenant of the League; yet, it was not altogether abolished. Along with the prohibited wars, there are also legal wars and tolerated wars.

According to the provisions of the Protocol, however, the states did not have the right, *in any case*, to wage war of their own initiative. It was permissible to wage war in three specific instances only:

1. When a state uses military power with the approval of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations according to the provisions of the Covenant or the Protocol, by going to the aid of one of its members attacked by another state.

2. When a state uses military power to compel the carrying-out of the judgment of the international tribunal according to the provisions of the Protocol, with the consent of the Council or the Assembly of the League.

3. Finally, when it is a question of a war of defense. The right of legal defense is preserved, especially in order that the world might not be faced by the accomplished fact that a small state has been destroyed by an unexpected attack of a large state. The attacked state is free to defend itself with all its power against the aggressor, without

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waiting for aid or for the decision of the League of Nations, which, according to the measures of the Covenant and the Geneva Protocol, must follow later.

It could be objected to this last stipulation that the Protocol did not mean progress, on the ground that it is not immediately possible to determine who is the aggressor and who is just defending himself and that he who wants to attack arranges matters in such a way that he provokes his antagonist to attack him. The Protocol provided for all this; these very familiar reasons led the authors of the Protocol to lay down principles which would help the Council of the League determine without delay who is the aggressor or who wants war and wishes to continue to fight at any cost.

The Protocol provided that, in the three cases mentioned, the state which resorts to military measures does not do so from its own initiative but as an agent and organ of the League.

The second most important principle of the Protocol, logically supplementing the first, was that every international conflict which could furnish a motive for a military conflict must be unconditionally submitted to a peaceful settlement. I cannot here describe in detail the complex legal machinery for such peaceful settlement. I shall list only its principles.

- First of all, the states can accept, by a special

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announcement, the authority of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, which is an organ of the League of Nations. Under this Optional Clause, the Court at present has jurisdiction in four great categories of international legal (not political) controversies. A state which accepts its authority by signing the Optional Clause has the right to exclude in advance from the competence of the Court, disputes which it wishes to settle by other means.

Although the Permanent Court of International Justice was in existence in 1924, this special obligation had been accepted by only a few states and by not one great power. It seemed in the majority of cases to be too far-reaching a renunciation of national and political sovereignty in favor of an international judicial tribunal.

After the signing of the Geneva Protocol, France, as the first European great power, accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. After 1924 such acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court was considered as a celebrated acknowledgment and emphasis of a peaceful policy in European politics. And rightfully so: let us just remember how far behind the jurisdiction of the present Permanent Court of International Justice the entire pre-war peace movement and the attempts of the years 1899 and 1907 at both Hague conferences were, and how pre-war Germany was criticized by the

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entire international public opinion because it stood opposed to the principles of a court of arbitration as it was then proposed.

The Permanent Court, as I have said before, examines legal controversies which have specifically been brought before it and ignores political disputes. Legal conflicts which do not belong there and political controversies which might incite military conflicts are, according to the text of the Protocol, subject to another procedure.

If the dispute does not come under the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice and if the parties do not agree to submit it to some other procedure of arbitration according to the Covenant, the dispute is automatically presented to the Council, which will try to settle it by conciliating the parties concerned. If the Council of the League fails in its conciliation attempts and the contesting parties do not agree on a solution in some other way, the Council immediately requires the disputing parties to transfer the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to arbitration procedure. In this case the assent of one party is enough for the arbitration ruling to become immediately binding.

If, after the Council intervenes, both parties simultaneously refuse the arbitration or court procedure, the dispute is returned to the Council, which has the right to solve the question. This

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solution is binding on both parties, provided that the Council's decision is unanimous. If the Council's decision is not unanimous, the case is brought before a body of arbiters who make the decision according to a majority ruling, and the sentenced state must submit to it.

In this way, if a friendly solution of the dispute is not arrived at, there is always the certainty that there will be a definite solution to every dispute either in the form of the findings of the Permanent Court of International Justice, or in the form of an arbitration decision of some chosen body of arbiters, or in the form of a unanimous decision of the Council.

The parties are obliged to submit to this solution and to carry it out. If they do not do so, they violate the obligations assumed toward the other signatories of the Protocol, and this violation carries with it penal provisions—that is, economic and military sanctions—set by the Protocol and by the Covenant of the League.

The last important section of the Protocol is concerned with the problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments.

The reduction and limitation of armaments will be made possible by the increase in general security which is to be the result of the obligatory settling of international disputes by peaceful means. It will be the result, too, of the certainty

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that the attacked state will have the military, economic, and financial help of all signatory states.

For states which are particularly exposed to attack because of their geographical position or whose life-centers lie near their boundaries, the danger of a sudden attack is such that it is necessary, before calling the conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments, that they should know the extent of the military aid they can count upon and be able then to present to the conference proposals for real reduction and limitation of armaments; this will require discussions between governments and negotiations with the Council even before the calling of the conference. The Council of the League is to plan the general program of the conference with regard for this situation and other criteria also.

Those were the most important articles of this document—the second general security pact prepared and voted in the League of Nations and intended to secure a lasting peace for the European continent. The entire Protocol was to take effect when the disarmament conference accepted the plan for the reduction and limitation of armament.

### THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

The Assembly of the League in 1924 undertook a task of political significance for the world, which,

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if it had been successful, would have profoundly changed the conditions of international political life.

There were doubts and hesitations as to whether the undertakings at Geneva were not premature and therefore condemned in advance to failure. There were reproaches, too, that the significance of this diplomatic act was exaggerated by its authors in the understandable desire that an era of permanent peace should actually begin. On the other hand, others went to the other extreme, trying to prove that it was a pacifistic toy, that there had always been wars and always would be, that in the decisive moments the Protocol would fail, that every state must rely first of all on its own army, its own power, that society today is altogether incapable of undertaking any serious action in these matters, that everywhere there is only dishonesty and idle talk, etc.

The authors of the Protocol knew well the obstacles and weaknesses of such undertakings. They knew that the Protocol must go through parliamentary battles before it could be put into effect, and that possibly it would not pass the first time, and that the fight for its existence would go on. But one thing was clear: the Geneva Protocol was voted unanimously by fifty-four states and immediately signed by sixteen states, including France as the first great power to accept it. The

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great principles of international policy embodied in it, which were so solemnly declared by fifty-four states, representing almost three-fourths of the world's population, could not permanently disappear from the forum of international post-war policy; they would reappear in one form or another if the Protocol were not put into effect. And the following year the question would again become the subject for great conflicts and discussions in the League of Nations.

The protagonists of the Protocol knew, of course, that the signing of this document did not mean that everything in the international world would be changed into paradise and that we would be freed of all cares. On the contrary, because it was a question of such far-reaching importance, they knew they must act carefully and thoughtfully not only on the question of accepting arbitration and the solving of international disputes by peaceful means but also on the question of reducing and limiting armaments and on all other consequences which would follow in international policy from the faithful application of the Protocol. And they knew, too, that after the signing of such a document a great task of educating public opinion and political leaders must begin and that ideas and political conceptions must be changed, adapted, and put into conformity with the ideas of the Protocol.

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The mere signing of such a diplomatic act would not, therefore, make war impossible; but, just as the Covenant of the League of Nations had contributed to world-peace in far-reaching matters, so could the Protocol at the beginning help more if it were put into practice. It could make wars still less likely than before, lead the entire world nearer to the ideal of lasting peace, and deter many from war adventures. It could be a great moral power and a real international force. Thus, it could become one of the cornerstones of the building of world-peace, for which all people of good will and all truly honest people have the duty to work.

## II. THE LOCARNO PACT

### THE REJECTION OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The problem of security was a fundamental part of the negotiations of the Peace Conference and theoretically received its solution in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was discussed, as we have seen in the last lecture, in the years 1919-23 in two special ways: (1) through the bilateral negotiations between France and Great Britain and (2) through the machinery of the League of Nations.

Until the year 1923 the French government insisted upon the fulfilment of the British pledge given at the Peace Conference (and repeated many times afterward) and asked for a bilateral treaty. But the League of Nations was obliged by the Covenant to discuss and settle the same problem for the whole of Europe in connection with the problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments. The British government, taking these facts into consideration, succeeded in 1923 in passing the whole question to Geneva, supposing perhaps that a general settlement would be less onerous for the British government and would probably facilitate collaboration with Germany. And so there began

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the negotiations on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

But the final draft of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance seemed to the Macdonald government—as we have seen—still too concrete and too much like the old alliances of the pre-war period. In rejecting it, Macdonald asked for a more general and less bilateral treaty between the powers and especially between France and Great Britain. The criticisms of the British government were taken into consideration, and the result of the further discussions in the League of Nations was the Geneva Protocol voted in the Assembly of 1924.

When the MacDonald and Herriot governments were formed in the spring of 1924, both emphasized the idea of the League of Nations, in contrast to the policy of their predecessors. Seeing from the records of four years' negotiation how great were the difficulties involved in an exclusive direct security pact between the two states, they both sought and supported the solution in the League, whose more active influence and co-operation in international policy coincided more with their own political beliefs.

This procedure was all the more acceptable to France because the British government, in its rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, advanced ideas which could be used for the achievement of general European security, and France

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saw the great obstacles in the way of a direct pact between Great Britain and herself, against which the Labour party, then in power, had taken a stand. Moreover, together with the British government, France recognized the possibility of solving the matter in such a way that the solution would not be aimed directly against Germany and that Germany could later voluntarily join in the entire undertaking. Finally, this procedure was acceptable to France because it meant the solving of the problem of security not only for western Europe but also for central and eastern Europe as well. For the French policy, and also for other states like Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, for neutral and for formerly enemy states, the solution in the League of Nations could mean the attainable maximum.

That is why in September, 1924, the Geneva Protocol was accepted with sincerity and with enthusiasm by all the interested representatives as a new general attempt to solve the problems of security, which all former attempts had failed to solve. It expressed not only the practical need felt by all at that time but also the sincere desire for real peace and the high ideals embodied in the League of Nations.

But immediately after the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924 a very strong opposition arose in Great Britain against the Geneva Protocol.

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Even in the Labour party, which in Geneva had initiated and accepted the Protocol, the division took place. The MacDonald section rapidly abandoned the Protocol, while the Henderson section conducted its election campaign on the platform of the Geneva Protocol. The elections brought back the Conservative government, with Baldwin as premier and Austen Chamberlain as foreign secretary.

Everybody knows what happened to the Protocol immediately after the new British elections. During the session of the Council of the League of Nations in December, 1924, in Rome, the British foreign secretary formulated the first reservations of the new British government to the Geneva Protocol, and in the following session of the same Council in March, 1925, he definitely opposed the Protocol as a means of solving the problem of security. From the speech of the British foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, it was evident: (a) that the British government did not consider acceptable for itself the general use of the principle of arbitration and wished to retain the possibility of solving some of its disputes in another way; (b) that its obligations, according to the Protocol, in consideration of the vastness of the British Empire, were too great and too general when applied to the whole of Europe and even to the world; especially did it seem impossible to take on itself the guaran-

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tees for the preservation of peace in some lands of eastern Europe.

In other words, the British government rejected again what it had rejected from the very beginning of the negotiations on security (except the negotiations in the League of Nations), that is, a guarantee of anything more than just the French-Belgian-German boundary. Practically, the British government turned back to the limited security pact, which might not be strictly bilateral, but which would engage directly only a limited number of powers.

Thus, the Geneva Protocol was set aside, and we come to the last act in negotiation over the problem of security in Europe.

### THE GERMAN PROPOSALS FOR A GUARANTEE PACT

This leads us to the attempts and the contribution of Germany toward solving the problem of European security.

The fall of the MacDonald government in the winter of 1924 and the reservations of the new British government made at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in December, 1924, in Rome, indicated that Great Britain would not accept the Geneva Protocol in its existing form, and so new negotiations on the problem of

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security and for a new guarantee pact became necessary.

Differing from the stand of the British Empire, the rest of the members of the Council of the League expressed themselves, in the session of March, 1925, in favor of all the principles of the Protocol, even while they admitted some of its deficiencies. They declared that they would continue to work for their realization, but would not insist on the accepted text of the Protocol. Nor did they basically reject the British proposal to solve the problem of security for the time being by a partial guarantee pact between the directly interested powers, subject to the control of the League of Nations.

France, having the Geneva Protocol as the only binding (although only morally binding) act after six years of negotiations for security, naturally emphasized its importance, although she had not refused in agreement with the other members of the League to substitute eventually something else for it which could solve the problem of European security somewhat more acceptably. She did not, however, abandon the plan to make the Protocol gradually operative.

The British government, on its part, declared that it did not wish to solve the problem of security by a diplomatic accord of a general nature such as the Geneva Protocol, but that it would

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prefer to use the principles of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, negotiated in the League of Nations in 1923, and that the solving of the problem of security was possible only by the conclusion of guarantee pacts between the individual interested powers.

Here, the British government added two further points: (1) Such a pact should be concluded in co-operation with all those directly interested, including in this case, Germany, so that it would not seem that a bloc was being created against it. (2) This pact should be subject to the control of the League of Nations and should agree with the principles which guide the entire activity and policy of the League.

Early in 1925, just at the time when the British foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, was preparing his answer on the Geneva Protocol, the German government presented, through its foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, its famous proposal of a European guarantee pact.

This was not, however, the first attempt by the German government to settle the problem of security between France and Germany. Under the influence of the occupation of the Ruhr during Poincaré's premiership in 1922, the first attempt was made on the part of Germany to contribute to the solution of this question. On December 18, 1922, the United States secretary of state, Hughes,

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gave the French ambassador, Jusserand, the proposal of the Reich chancellor, Dr. Cuno, in which he proposed that the great powers interested in the Rhine boundaries should mutually bind themselves—and America should be the guarantor—that, for a period of about thirty years (i.e., one human generation), they would not wage war against each other, unless and until there had been a general vote of the people.

Premier Poincaré rejected the offer as unsatisfactory, pointing out that the Covenant of the League of Nations guaranteed exactly the same thing but without a time limit and that neither the United States nor Great Britain manifested any intention of accepting these obligations.

The second German proposal was made on May 2, 1923, when the German government presented Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Japan, and the United States with its proposals on the question of reparations and added to them an offer to conclude a pact with France by which it would be bound to settle all conflicts in a peaceful way instead of by war. As a condition to the conclusion of this pact, Germany demanded the evacuation of the Ruhr regions. In September, 1923, in a public address in Stuttgart, the minister of foreign affairs, Stresemann, repeated this same thought with minor changes. These manifestations led to no further negotiations; they were considered generally

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as tactical moves to bring about the evacuation of the Ruhr region.

The end of the year 1923 and the year 1924 were filled, as has already been said, with negotiations of the League of Nations for a treaty of mutual assistance and for the Protocol. The attempts on the part of Germany to solve the problem of security by its direct proposals were stopped through these events in Geneva just as were the direct Franco-British negotiations.

Now, after the failure of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the rejection of the Geneva Protocol by the British government, Germany came back to the idea of direct negotiations with Great Britain and France.

On January 10, 1925, the Allies decided that the Cologne zone should still remain under occupation. Premier Herriot answered the German protest in his famous speech, delivered in parliament on January 28, 1925, which aroused great attention and even some sensational reaction. Herriot recalled the negotiations at the Peace Conference on the security of France and remembered the concessions that France made without yet having the fulfilment of the promise of security which had been given to her. He called attention further to the fact that the military control committee had material which showed that secret military preparations were being made in Germany and that there-

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fore the obligations of the peace treaty had not been fulfilled on this point by Germany. He thus emphasized the possibility of accepting the Geneva Protocol and the definite arrangement of military control, in order to solve the entire question of France's security. The question of the military control of the former enemy states was now discussed in the League of Nations, which was to carry it out, according to the peace treaty. In the same way, the League of Nations was to have charge of the control of the demilitarized left bank of the Rhine, according to the text of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. The solving of these questions was always considered as a part of the problem of security as a whole and was therefore being weighed even in the negotiations of that time.

Two days later (January 30) the Reich chancellor, Dr. Luther, answered with a speech in which he presented a new offer of the German government and in which he emphasized these things:

1. Premier Herriot bases the relations of Germany with France on a guarantee of France's security. Germany agrees with this; she is interested in the solving of the guarantee pact and wants to co-operate; but the question of security is also a German question, and Germany asks security for herself.

2. Germany is in accord even with the French

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aim of effecting a universal peace convention, such as the Geneva Protocol. This universal convention can, in the opinion of the German government, be gradually prepared by partial guarantee pacts, by which security would be guaranteed immediately, wherever the problem is most pressing. Germany would be willing to co-operate immediately in such negotiations.

Then, on the ninth of March, the German government presented a confidential memorandum to the governments of the great powers, in which the ideas of Chancellor Dr. Luther were expressed, with certain important detailed and explicit additions: it would be a question of concluding a guarantee pact among the great powers, by which the present *status quo* on the Rhine would be reciprocally guaranteed for all states. The provisions of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, concerning the demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine, would be carried out, and, after that, arbitration treaties would be signed between Germany and all other interested great and small powers, including Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the memorandum the German government repeated the idea of Dr. Luther that this partial guarantee pact could be the first step toward a general world-protocol guaranteeing security altogether.

Such is the history of the development of the

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problem of security. In the first stage at the Peace Conference, up to 1923, it was a question of a guarantee pact between Clemenceau and Poincaré, on the one hand, and Lloyd George and Lord Curzon, on the other; simply a French-British-Belgian guarantee pact (with the participation of the delegation of the United States during the Peace Conference).

The second stage meant the setting-aside of this bilateral treaty, and instead of it the League of Nations attempted to substitute a universal pact in the form of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, or the Geneva Protocol.

The third stage involved not only a compromise between the two preceding attempts but also the incorporation of the proposals which came on the initiative of the German government. It was considered as the first practical step toward a universal security pact.

### NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE GERMAN MEMORANDUM

Many more or less sensational reports were soon added to the information concerning the German memorandum. Soon after the proposals were received, there appeared, in some of the English newspapers, explanations of the fact that Germany recognized the Treaty of Versailles and the *status quo* in the west, but not in the east, and that Ger-

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many intended a treaty of arbitration for her eastern neighbors, to which even boundary questions would be submitted. As a result, fears arose that it was a diplomatic maneuver in which Germany concealed some other ideas.

Better information confirmed the fact that the German memorandum meant that in the west Germany definitely and solemnly recognized the *status quo* and the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, but that, so far as the eastern boundary was concerned, it took the same stand that all pre-war French governments took concerning Alsace-Lorraine, that is, that Germany had signed the Treaty of Versailles and would therefore abide by it and would never stir up a military conflict because of it, even when it concerned the eastern frontiers. The purpose of Germany in concluding a treaty of arbitration on the basis of the existing international treaties was supposedly to offer further guarantees in this respect. I was assured that the German proposal did not intend that the question of boundaries would be subjected to arbitration procedure.

I had an opportunity to discuss these questions in detail in Geneva with the British minister of foreign affairs, Chamberlain, with the French delegate, the former Premier Briand, and with Ministers Hymans and Skrzynski. I especially informed the Italian government of our attitude through its ambassador to Paris, Baron Avezzano.

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Minister Chamberlain again emphasized the firm stand of Great Britain: that under existing circumstances, while fully and consistently abiding by the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, she could not do more than guarantee the Rhine boundaries. Furthermore, Britain was convinced that a pact such as the one intended at the Peace Conference or such as was discussed by Lloyd George and Briand at Cannes was impossible at the moment. The only possible form was a pact which would be a compromise on all former attempts, in which Germany would participate and which would be controlled by the League of Nations.

I informed Minister Chamberlain of the stand-point of our government:

*a)* So far as we were concerned, we considered the solution of the problem of security in the Geneva Protocol as the best, but we did not refuse to examine the German proposals, or a treaty of arbitration as a certain step forward in the general effort for peace.

*b)* We wished, however, to know the exact text of such a pact and proposed arbitration treaties before we took any binding steps.

*c)* I considered it impossible that our rights, guaranteed to us by the peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, or Trianon should be touched or weakened in any way in the formulation of a guarantee pact.

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*d)* I considered the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations and the adoption of the mutual rights and obligations resulting from the signing of the Covenant of the League of Nations as a necessary supplement of the guarantee pact which was to usher in a new stabilization era of peace and peace treaties in Europe.

*e)* I voiced my conviction that such a pact would be only the first step and that it would, under the aegis of the League of Nations, necessarily lead to further guarantee pacts which, finally, as the German memorandum pointed out, would lead to a universal or at least a European guarantee pact—that is, finally, to the principles of the Geneva Protocol. After all, the German memorandum—according to my interpretation—was far more imbued with these principles than had seemed to be the case at first glance.

We were agreed in Geneva with the French delegate, Briand, and Ministers Hymans and Skrzynski, that the German proposal should be studied with necessary reserve, but objectively, and that it was not possible to distrust it and to reject it *a priori*. On my following visit to Paris in June, 1925, all these questions were discussed again very carefully with both President Doumergue and Premier Herriot, and there was complete agreement with the French government.

Premier Herriot agreed fully with my stand-

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points and with the reservations which we made to these proposals, and in addition he felt, as we did, that this attempt might perhaps be considered as a serious and sincere one, since it could be supposed that, even in Germany at that time, the majority of the nation felt the need of tranquillity and peace after ten years of difficult military and political battles. For this reason, there was need of greater care, of calm and sound judgment. It was necessary to study the question well in all details and to insist on united action, so that it would be clear whether all truly desired the solution of the problem of security and permanent peace.

Beginning the negotiations on the text of the German memorandum, the Allied powers officially exchanged their views, and all agreed on the main issues. Later Belgium, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia followed suit. After this agreement was reached, negotiations were begun with Germany, to whom two notes were sent, the first on June 16, the second on August 24. In these notes the following main principles for a possible agreement were established:

1. Germany and France bind themselves to respect the present territorial arrangement as well as the Treaty of Versailles, and, in carrying out its settlements, they mutually denounce any action of violence or war whatsoever against each other.

2. The obligations on the part of both shall in-

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clude the demilitarized Rhine boundary, so far as its inviolability goes. The exceptions by which it would be possible to cross this boundary militarily will be determined exactly.

3. Great Britain or Italy eventually will become the guarantor of the carrying-out of the obligations upon which they are agreed.

4. Germany will join the League of Nations and will assume the rights and duties of its membership.

5. Germany will conclude arbitration treaties with her neighbors; France will be able to guarantee the arbitration treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The negotiations for the determining of these principles lasted six whole months and were truly difficult, for in her answer Germany emphatically called the attention of the Allied powers to many of her difficulties and objections.

The former Allied powers in their second note expressed the hope that an agreement would be reached on these questions and, after exchanging opinions among themselves, proceeded to the formulation of the text of the future agreements with Germany. In the early part of September, therefore, they invited legal experts of the principally interested states to London, where the text of the agreement on the Rhine Pact and the principles of the arbitration treaties were fundamen-

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tally decided upon, except for three controversial, essential questions.

After this agreement, finally, the closing conference at Locarno took place, October 5-16, 1925, where, after ten days of arduous negotiation, an agreement was reached on all three contested points:

1. Germany gave up her opposition to the mutual guarantee of the arbitration treaties of France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; it was agreed that the Rhine Pact should formulate this guarantee generally, making it more acceptable to Germany, and yet not changing the guarantee at all in principle or in effectiveness.

2. Germany consented, further, that the arbitration treaties of Czechoslovakia and Poland be identical with those of France and Belgium and that they be integral; that is, that the peaceful settling of international disputes apply to all questions.

3. Finally, Germany and the former Allied powers arrived at a compromise concerning Article 16 of the Covenant of the League without basically changing it in any way, and so even the question of the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations was solved. Under these circumstances, it was possible to sign on October 16, 1925, in Locarno, the Concluding Protocol concerning the so-

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called Locarno treaties, which declares as concluded the following diplomatic acts:

- a) The treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, the so-called Rhine Guarantee Pact
- b) Four arbitration treaties between Germany on the one side and France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the other
- c) The guarantee treaties of Czechoslovakia and Poland with France
- d) The collective note of all states participating in the Locarno Conference concerning Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in case Germany joins the League

### WHAT WAS THE CONTENT OF THE LOCARNO PACT?

1. The first important diplomatic document resulting from the Locarno Conference, the so-called "Rhine Pact," has the following main features:

- a) Germany, France, and Belgium pledge themselves to respect the inviolability of the French-Belgian-German boundaries.
- b) Germany, France, and Belgium mutually pledge themselves not to undertake any invasion and not to resort to any military measures, that is, not to wage war against one another in the future.
- c) The obligation not to wage war does not apply in case of necessary defense in case of violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the demilitarized boundary, in the case of fulfilling the obligations of a member of the League of Nations and the putting into effect of paragraph 7 of Article 15 and Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (which includes the case of France's aid to Czechoslovakia and Poland). Military measures are not based on any preceding decision of the Council of the League if it is a case of necessary defense,

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flagrant violation of the statute on a demilitarized zone, or flagrant attack and violence.

- d) Germany, France, and Belgium, having determined not to wage war against one another, pledge themselves at the same time, by special arbitration treaties, to settle all their disputes in a peaceful way, by judicial and arbitration procedures.
- e) Great Britain and Italy guarantee the keeping of these pledges on the part of the participating states.
- f) All the rights and obligations of the participating states resulting from the Covenant of the League of Nations remain unchanged; that is, the entire agreement is made within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations—is, in fact, the carrying-out of certain of its principles and articles. These pledges become valid with the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations.

2. The second no less important instrument of the Locarno peace treaty was to be the series of arbitration treaties of Germany with France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Each is a complete arbitration treaty, not excluding any dispute whatsoever from arbitration and conciliatory procedure. The Locarno Conference did not, then, take for a pattern the arbitration treaties which Germany concluded with Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland, and which excluded from arbitration procedure disputes concerning independence, territorial inviolability, and other highest interests—that is, exactly those most important controversies which most often lead to wars. On the contrary, it was governed by the principles which the League of Nations upheld to this time.

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In substance all the concluded treaties of arbitration recognize two categories of disputes: (1) those in which parties contend for a right, positively given and defined by treaties or other obligations or by principles of international law, etc., and (2) those conflicts in which there is a controversy of interests. In Locarno the differences of the second type were declared, not altogether precisely, as differences of interests or purely political differences. This type concerns a dispute in which one state takes full advantage, for its own benefit, of a given *status quo* on the basis of international treaties and the principles of international law, and the other state, feeling affected by it, while not in any way claiming that the first has violated a law, tries to change the burdensome condition resulting from some treaties. For instance the immigration legislation of the United States and the effort of the Japanese to have it changed can be considered as the commonest example of such conflicting interests.

The opinion that various disputes between states should be considered and solved on a purely legal basis found no support with any state at Locarno. It was therefore necessary to differentiate the two categories of disputes. It was made evident how very dangerous it was to make possible the solving of controversies of only the first category, the so-called legal controversies, and to consider the so-

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called controversies of interests or political disputes as insoluble, as had always been the case in arbitration and conciliatory procedure. The differences of interests, not based on actual law, very often occur between states and are most dangerous. Therefore, if the way is not to be left open to conflicts of force, because of such disagreements, suitable ways and means to remove them must be found. They were found at Locarno.

It has been remarked that a guarantee pact was concluded for one boundary of Germany, while arbitration treaties only were concluded for the other. It happened because neither Great Britain nor any other great European state except France would take on direct guarantees of other than the western boundaries, which was also one of the reasons why they rejected the Geneva Protocol. That is why they looked to the Arbitration Treaty as well as elsewhere for other ways which would be more or less equally valuable with the guarantee pact. And so the arbitration treaties of Poland and Czechoslovakia with Germany became far more significant politically.

These arbitration treaties with Germany had, first of all, political clauses, particularly those clauses in the introduction mentioned before, which emphasize in negative form that both states do not wish to wage war against each other and that they must respect international treaties. In addition,

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in Article 21 of the Arbitration Treaty, Germany and Czechoslovakia reserved the rights and duties resulting from the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus it is stressed that as members of the League of Nations, according to Article 10 of the Covenant, Germany must respect the territorial integrity and political independence of Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia that of Germany.

3. Besides this political side of the Arbitration Treaty, further means were sought by which it would be possible most closely to approach the Rhine Pact and solve the problem of security for Central Europe also, as far as it could be solved at all under contemporary conditions. This desire gave rise to the idea of mutual guarantee treaties of France with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Being a specification of Czechoslovakia's former treaty with France from the year 1923, they were to be formulated in such a way that they would be a supplement of the Rhine Pact and the Arbitration Treaty and that, corresponding to the spirit of the Rhine Pact, they would not be aimed against Germany in any way.

First of all, it was necessary to think of the eventuality, as in the Rhine Pact, that one of the participating states, after having signed the Arbitration Treaty, would make a military attack on the territory of the other and so violate its given

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obligations. Furthermore, provision must be made in case, for example, that Poland and Czechoslovakia, fulfilling the provisions of their Arbitration Treaty, submit to the arbitration ruling or the unanimous decisions of the Council, but that the other party would not submit and would begin a war against Poland or Czechoslovakia without any provocation on their part. Thus, the second party would be violating the Arbitration Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This violation of the Covenant, however, would develop sanctions against Germany according to Article 16, and every state member of the League would be obliged to put in effect economic and financial sanctions against Germany. Yet, Czechoslovakia would have no legal right to military aid, according to Article 16, for paragraph 2 of Article 16 imposes on the Council of the League only the duty of recommending to interested governments that they send military aid, but it does not impose any obligations upon the state-members of the League of Nations to follow this recommendation of the Council and actually give aid.

For such a case, the Czechoslovak-French Guarantee Treaty was concluded, as is quite evident, in full agreement with the spirit and meaning of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By this Guarantee Treaty, France bound herself so that, in case the other party committed such a violation,

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Article 16 was to be applied in such a way that she would give Czechoslovakia immediate aid and support. Czechoslovakia and Poland took the same obligation upon themselves with regard to France.

It is necessary to emphasize the fact that this aid would be given automatically, as is clear from the use of the word "immediate" in the first and second paragraph of Article 1 of the Guarantee Treaty. In this connection the provisions of Articles 1 and 3 of the Rhine Pact must be mentioned.

Article 1 of this pact designates the inviolability of the Rhine boundary, and in Article 3, paragraph 1, the contracting parties bind themselves that they will not resort to war in any case. By these rulings, the Rhine boundary would have become an untrespassable barrier, so that France could not keep her obligations toward Czechoslovakia and Poland, if the next stipulation of Article 2 did not admit the possibility of crossing the Rhine boundary in exactly the above-mentioned cases. The Czechoslovak-French Guarantee Treaty was concerned exclusively with these cases, and these stipulations were included in the Rhine Pact out of consideration for Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Czechoslovak-French and the Polish-French guarantee agreements made up a basic part also of the Locarno treaties. They had no barbs aimed

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against Germany, which acknowledged it, signing the concluding act of the Locarno Conference, where the conclusion of this agreement was mentioned in a special paragraph. In the same way, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium also acknowledged these guarantee treaties. By this fact the former Czechoslovak treaty with France concluded in 1923 took on a decidedly new character: it received the acknowledgment of an international conference and was pushed completely into the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, losing the character of an exclusive bilateral treaty directed against a third power.

### CONCLUSIONS

All the diplomatic acts of Locarno form one inseparable political whole. Legally and materially these seven acts are drawn up as one single diplomatic document: the Concluding Protocol, the Rhine Pact, four arbitration treaties, and the collective note concerning Article 16 of the Covenant of the League. Both guarantee treaties, the French-Czechoslovak and the French-Polish, formally make up the second special whole. However, Article 2 of the Rhine Pact refers to them specifically, and they are made note of especially in the Concluding Protocol, so that they obviously and unquestionably form a part of the Locarno treaties.

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All the Locarno acts have the same ideological basis and follow the same aim. The Concluding Protocol of the Conference expresses it in the words that the concluded treaties and agreements have relation to one another. Legal expression of the inseparability of the Locarno agreements was given in the statute that all acts acquire and lose effectiveness at the same time and under the same conditions (Arts. 8 and 10 of the Rhine Pact, Art. 22 of the Arbitration Treaty with Germany, and Art. 4 of the Polish and Czechoslovak Guarantee Treaty with France). According to these statutes, the Locarno agreements became effective as soon as all the ratifications of these treaties had been delivered to the League of Nations and Germany had become a member of the League of Nations.

There was no specific time limit to their validity; they were to come to an end one year after the Council of the League of Nations, by a two-thirds majority, should determine that the League of Nations was established so securely as to give sufficient guarantees to the contracting parties. The Locarno acts and the treaties signed at the same time could not, therefore, acquire and lose effectiveness one without the other and could not lose validity by the wish of one party. This, too, was very important politically, because it was the expression of the idea that the peace of Europe must be taken as a whole, that western Europe could not

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be separated from central and eastern Europe if real peace in Europe were to be safeguarded.

The Locarno Treaty was unquestionably the most important political instrument for European peace in the post-war period of European policy. It was a real security and peace pact. It had a really sound and honest basis and was concluded in good faith and according to the desires and with the collaboration of both sides. It was also a just treaty.

The action of the men who have violated and destroyed it must be considered as criminal. The present tragic situation of Europe and of the world is one of the consequences of the destruction of this great security pact.

### III. THE LOCARNO POLICY AND SOME CONCLUSIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

#### THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TREATIES OF LOCARNO

As far as the political significance of the Locarno Agreement is concerned, I should like to emphasize, first of all, the following points:

1. Historically and politically the Locarno treaties resulted from the struggles of 1922-25 in the League of Nations. I do not wish to consider in detail what the Locarno agreements took over from the deliberations that took place in the League of Nations or their relation to the Geneva Protocol. Even if the Locarno treaties were not all that the Protocol was intended to be, they were definitely a step in that direction. Moreover, the participants in the conference clearly pointed out as early as September, 1925, in Geneva, that the Locarno agreements were the carrying-out of the principles and ideas which had been advocated and passed on in the League of Nations during the preceding years.

2. For the first time in the history of international European politics, the Locarno agreements, following the pattern of the Geneva Protocol, in-

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troduced the obligation of sovereign states not to wage war under any circumstances and to solve all disputes by peaceful means. I do not mean to assert that this meant the permanent removal of war. It did at least mean that resort to war would be more difficult in western and central Europe. There was also a possibility that war would be eliminated for decades to come.

3. The Locarno treaties, providing as they did a considerable increase in European security, meant likewise a change in the existing principles of international law. Even in 1922 scarcely anyone believed that four European powers and three other important states could bind themselves not to wage war and to submit all their controversies to peaceful negotiations. No mere Franco-British agreement could approach this kind of achievement.

4. The Locarno treaties, originating from the action of the League of Nations, indisputably meant at this time the strengthening of that organization. They were drawn up in the spirit of the League and gave it a far-reaching role in the organization for peace which they created. They brought about the inclusion of Germany in the League and thus made it more effective and more nearly universal. Thus they compelled all other nonmembers of the League of Nations to begin to look upon its policy in a different light.

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5. Finally, I should like to emphasize the last political consequence of Locarno. It was clear to every politically minded person that the former tense condition of Europe could not last long. An agreement between the two camps engaged in the World War had to be reached. If it had not been reached at this time, there would have been a political crisis in Europe. Germany entered into European political life again as a participant with full legal rights and as an equal, as a new great power. That was a significant thing for Europe and for Germany, and everyone in Europe and in the world had to realize this fully. It was an attempt to create a new European psychology, a new European balance, altogether new international conditions. It was an attempt also toward moral disarmament, toward a new consolidation, both political and economic. It meant the acceptance of the *status quo* in western and central Europe for the immediate future, and this in itself was of great political significance. It meant, last of all, that Soviet Russia had to arrange her affairs accordingly and come to an agreement with Europe. At this time I expressed the opinion that perhaps it would not be long before we should come to a new pact, where all Europe would come to an agreement with Soviet Russia. I thought it would be for the good of both Russia and Europe. And I expressed the hope, too, at that time that the United States

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also would gradually change its attitude toward Europe as a result of the Locarno treaties.

### THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE SO-CALLED EUROPEAN LOCARNO POLICY

The period of European policies after the signing of the Locarno Treaty is filled by the most interesting and important attempts to continue in the sense just indicated the Locarno policy in Europe. From March 9, the date of the German memorandum, to September, 1925 (when the Assembly met), the negotiations between the former Allies and Germany had proceeded so far that even the proponents of the Geneva Protocol gave their support to the Locarno policy. Everyone realized that if, after the Assembly, we should bring Germany and the other powers together in a Locarno treaty, it would mark very great progress. For this reason, the main political resolution voted in the Assembly of 1925 expressed the hope that the coming negotiations between the powers in Locarno would bring the successful conclusion of the great new security pact.

The Locarno Pact was signed October 16, 1925. Immediately afterward, the discussions between France and Germany advanced to a consideration of what the Locarno policy meant in practice.

What did the Locarno policy, which dominated European politics from 1926 to 1930, signify? In a

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word, it signified the moral and political liquidation of war and also the progressive adaptation of the Treaty of Versailles to a new situation. It meant a *rapprochement* between France and Germany. It meant a specific pledge and obligation by Great Britain in regard to the Continent, and, as a consequence, there was produced a situation in central Europe in which the eastern neighbors of Germany also would come to a *rapprochement* with Germany. It meant also that there would definitely be a *rapprochement* between the small powers of central Europe—especially between Hungary and the Little Entente powers on the one side and Bulgaria and other Balkan powers on the other. In other words, the so-called Locarno policy signified the systematic preparation of a new system of post-war peaceful policy in Europe.

I emphasize especially that, in the minds of some of the important political leaders in Europe at this time, this scheme of policy was definite and clear. We tried to do all this quite consciously. Briand, being the recognized leader of France at this time, and having a very great influence in the League of Nations and among the other states, had a very definite plan and program for this policy. Although he was very strongly criticized in France by his opponents, there is no doubt that his general program from 1926 to 1930 was a systematic and complete conception of a new European policy.

I shall give you as proof some of the important

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actions which followed the Locarno Treaty. Immediately after the signing of the Locarno Treaty, there were discussions—already in Locarno and during the whole year of 1926—between Briand, Stresemann, and Dr. Luther. In these discussions three main problems were continually present in the minds of the German and French delegates: (1) reparations, (2) occupation of the Rhineland, and (3) disarmament.

In France, very important political circles understood that these three great problems would come to the fore, and for this reason they were opposed to the Briand policy. On the other hand, responsible and informed people in the other interested states understood that the reparations problem would again have to be discussed, that the question of evacuation would be reopened, and that the disarmament conference would have to come soon in order to try to create a system of military equality among the powers. France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and some other smaller states therefore finally accepted the general lines of Briand's policy. But many of us knew, too, that in order to make it effective and successful we had to prepare also a real system of security in Europe against the time when Germany would not be so weak from paying reparations, would be free from the military occupation, and would have equality of armaments with other nations.

How was this security to be attained? It was to

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be attained through the so-called Locarno policy. That meant to work for the greater security of everyone, of all states in Europe, and for the preparation of a new, peaceful atmosphere in Europe. For this reason, we initiated in Geneva a new line of action. First of all, we accelerated the movement for arbitration. Arbitration as an obligatory system of peaceful settlement had been accepted for the first time in the Geneva Protocol. This principle we preserved completely in the Locarno Pact. The principle of obligatory arbitration became a great slogan. Everybody at once began to believe in arbitration.

In December, 1924, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in rejecting the Protocol, had been opposed to obligatory arbitration for the British Empire. In October, 1925, Great Britain signed the arbitration treaties. In 1926 we established in Geneva a committee for arbitration and security. I was elected president of this committee, which received from the Assembly of the League of Nations a commission to prepare a general system of model treaties of arbitration, a system of model security pacts, and a system of model nonaggression pacts. This new movement was to complete the Locarno Pact in other parts of Europe. The Locarno Pact was only a partial system of security; we, therefore, had to elaborate the general system of treaties of arbitration and of nonaggression which would prepare

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a new basis for general security of all other states in Europe.

This movement had great political influence; in two years more than a hundred treaties of arbitration and security pacts were signed between the states. I agree that it was not completely successful because it failed later when the whole system of Locarno failed. But again I emphasize the fact that there was in Geneva, in these four years after Locarno, a really great practical political movement which had as its basis the philosophy and the moral and political ideas of the Geneva Protocol, of the Locarno Treaty, of the Covenant, and of the principles of arbitration.

At the same time, Briand, being completely in accord with this idea, agreed to prepare the disarmament conference. The French delegation itself proposed in the Assembly of 1926 to convoke the preparatory disarmament committee, which began to work in the year 1926, and finished in 1930 with the drafting of the complete text of the disarmament treaty.



### THE BRIAND-KELLOGG PACT AS THE RESULT OF THE LOCARNO PACT

Another thing which was very important, and which touches the United States, came at this time. Briand, having the Locarno Pact with Germany, Italy, and Great Britain, in 1927 approached

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another great power—the United States—and proposed to Secretary of State Kellogg a peace pact under the terms of which both states would forever renounce war in their relation with each other and would solve any future disputes by arbitration or conciliation. After a discussion of this proposal, Kellogg extended this plan to a general pact for the prevention of war, which would be accepted first by all the great powers and eventually also by other states. In the discussion it was agreed to have the proposal presented to all powers and to have France inform them of the standpoint of the Paris government.

The Briand-Kellogg proposal had the same aim as the Geneva Protocol. It demanded that all states renounce war as an instrument of policy and consent to arbitration and conciliation methods for the settling of all their disputes. It was brief and simple in form, and therein lay its advantage over the Geneva Protocol, but it contained no sanctions whatsoever against violators of the pact. It was, therefore, to function first of all as a moral force.

As in the case of all similar plans, there arose at first a number of doubts, criticisms, and misunderstandings. The most characteristic expression of these doubts was contained in the French reply, which in turn was answered by Kellogg in his speech of April 26, 1928, and which removed the

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main doubts. This led to a mutual preliminary exchange of opinions on the American proposal among the great powers. A further contribution to the discussion was Chamberlain's answer in the latter part of May, 1928, in which some of the French reservations were stressed, others mitigated.

The discussions of this peace pact among the great powers made it clear that it would mean: (a) that the great powers and other signatory states would renounce war as a means of settling their own disputes; (b) that the obligations which ensued from membership in the League of Nations would still be fulfilled; that is, if the Council of the League of Nations, according to the article of the Covenant on sanctions, should decide to put into effect military or economic sanctions (blockade) against one of its members, compliance would not constitute a violation of the peace pact; (c) that the obligations which the states assumed in concluding the treaties in Locarno would remain inviolate—if they complied with these, they would not be violating the new peace pact; (d) that, if one of the signatory states would violate the pact, the other signatories would be freed of their obligation; and (e) that, according to the French reservations, a formula would need to be found, according to which the obligations of other international treaties would remain inviolate, so far as these treaties did

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not conflict with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The consequences of this new pact were considered at that time as very great. First of all, in Europe many people believed that the United States would be drawn considerably closer to Europe. Considering that the Covenant of the League of Nations was to remain inviolate, it was taken as a *rapprochement* between the United States and the League of Nations in a way which at that time was the only possible one for the United States. It would mean the strengthening of the peace work of the League of Nations and a moral support for all undertakings which tended to make war impossible. The United States, in signing the pact, would not take upon itself any obligations so far as European conditions and treaties were concerned, but by their great moral guarantee would help bring about the solving of European disputes by peaceful methods rather than by war.

For these reasons we at that time looked with favor upon the Kellogg Pact. We considered the entire French-American program as a very significant step forward in the struggle for peace in Europe. We considered it to be a consistent continuation of the policy of Locarno. It was not another Geneva Protocol; it had no sanctions and did not involve disarmament, but the two great principles of the Geneva Protocol were in it.

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The Briand-Kellogg Pact was signed August 27, 1928. During these negotiations the public discussions between Germany and France were pushed a little into the background, but more intimate negotiations continued between these two countries. It was quite clear that the two great problems, reparations and evacuation of the Rhineland, would remain after the signature of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. I want to repeat that throughout these negotiations Briand was pursuing a consistent policy. Having initiated the arbitration system in Geneva, with the help of a certain number of other statesmen, the system of nonaggression pacts and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, he thought that the remaining problems of European diplomacy were ripe for discussion.

### THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE MAIN FRANCO- GERMAN DISPUTES IN 1928-29: THE HAGUE CONFERENCE

After the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, Germany's expected demands were presented to the Allied powers. During the Assembly of 1928 a new German chancellor, the Social-Democratic leader, Herrmann Mueller, quite openly presented his program to the powers in Geneva. This involved a revision of the Dawes Plan, evacuation of the left bank of the Rhine, and the convocation of the disarmament conference. Again the negotia-

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tions were very difficult and sometimes very dramatic. I participated in some of the discussions and was personally in close contact with Herrmann Mueller. I must say that he was, in these negotiations, very honest, loyal, and fair.

Briand and others in France understood very well the significance of this moment. As early as September 16, 1928, a common declaration was signed between the interested powers in Geneva that the complete and final settlement of the reparations question would be undertaken, that the question of evacuation would be discussed, and that the question of the convocation of the disarmament conference would soon be settled.

These powers decided to create a committee of experts for the revision of the Dawes Plan, and this committee was convoked February 11, 1929. The committee of experts elected as its president the American financial expert, Owen D. Young, after whom was named the new plan for reparations payments. The work of the committee was finished on July 7, 1929, and provided for a reduction of all German reparations payments to thirty-eight billion marks.

The nomination of the committee for the evacuation of the Rhineland, which was a very difficult financial and administrative problem, was also decided upon. It was agreed that, when all this preparatory work would be finished, a new interna-

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tional conference would be convoked. This conference, although the Young Plan was completed only in July, 1929, was convoked in August of the same year at The Hague. The conference prepared and accepted definitely two proposals: the new Young Plan for reparations and the plan for the evacuation of the Rhineland.

Generally, in accounts of European politics after Locarno the foregoing facts are not put together as I have put them here. The four years' policy after Locarno constituted a new and consistent pattern of European policy; and, if sometimes Europe is criticized as being unreasonable, unjust, and not constructive enough, you will see that the criticism is not entirely justified. There were people, statesmen, and states who understood the necessities of Europe, and there is no doubt that France and the former Allies tried to give opportunity to Germany to collaborate peacefully and to save the peace of Europe. There is no doubt that Herrmann Mueller had very great successes at this time. And the so-called *Versailler Diktat* was profoundly changed in favor of Germany a long time before the Nazi dictatorship came into power. These changes signified very great concessions on the part of France.

The Hague Conference was convoked in August, 1929. It accepted in outline the solutions indicated and was adjourned to January, 1930. When it met

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again and completed its work by the signature of the so-called final settlement of reparations and of the agreement about evacuation of the Rhineland, it also initiated the settlement of reparations for Austria, and for Hungary, as well as of all financial, economic, and partly political questions between Hungary and the powers of the Little Entente.

Finally, the last problem was settled. In September, 1930, during the Assembly of the League a decision was reached about the convocation of the disarmament conference. Briand proposed to invoke it either at the end of 1931 or at the beginning of 1932, and it was finally called for February 1, 1932.

Before coming to the conference, Briand made two other gestures.

First of all, at the end of the Assembly of 1929, he presented to all European powers a memorandum about the European union. It was an attempt at the preparation of a kind of European federation and was given to the states for discussion. The League of Nations Assembly in 1930 decided to form a European committee in Geneva in which the preparations for the new organization of Europe were to be made.

I must say that in the year 1930, even among the people who believed in the Locarno policy, pessimism began to be felt, and this proposal of Briand met with criticism. But, in spite of all that, Briand

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made a second gesture: he made his famous trip to Berlin. For the first time since the war, a French foreign minister made a trip to Berlin. It was a special kind of gesture when Briand went to the tomb of Stresemann in Berlin and placed there a wreath! That was, in my opinion, the last chapter of the Locarno policy.

## THE COLLAPSE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Just at this moment there developed a strong reaction against this whole political activity of Briand, of other statesmen who believed in the Locarno policy, and of the League of Nations.

In the Far East the Manchukuo question was raised by Japan in the year 1931. Briand was still at Geneva, and I must say today that Briand did not see at that time that it was the beginning of the collapse of collective security. He believed that this conflict would be settled peacefully. In my opinion, however, it was the beginning of the downfall of collective security in Europe and in the world. In 1932, while the disarmament conference was meeting, the problem of Manchukuo and the question of the invasion of Shanghai were put in a very violent form. Very soon it was clear that Japan would go farther and had decided not to give up. The League of Nations had not the courage, at this time, to settle the question according to the Covenant. There is no doubt that the absence of

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the United States and of Soviet Russia from Geneva at this time was one of the fundamental factors contributing to the final failure of the League of Nations in this conflict.

(( In 1933 came the German Nazi dictatorship. In 1934 began the conflict over Abyssinia. Sanctions were voted and failed. In 1935 came the agitation in central Europe, the attempt of German Naziism to disorganize Austria; in 1936, the violation of Locarno and the military occupation of the Rhineland; in 1937 the invasion of Austria; in 1938 the September crisis and in March, 1939, the invasion of Czechoslovakia. What will yet happen in 1939 and 1940, you do not know and I do not know. I am convinced that very grave events will come. And so, after the long and successful fight for the building of the system of collective security since 1922, we see since 1931 the progressive downfall of the same system and of the League. ))

This was the consequent, inevitable course of events as a result of the abandonment, in 1931, by the European great powers, members of the League, of the real Geneva policy, of the policy of collective security on the basis of the Covenant, of the Locarno Pact, and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. If you wish to understand the real European post-war policy, including its present failure, you must follow all these events from the negotiations in 1921 and 1922 in Geneva, the discussions between

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France and Great Britain about the bilateral pact, through the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, Locarno, the Kellogg Pact, The Hague Conference, and all the events between 1931 and 1939 which I have just enumerated.

All that has happened since 1931 could, of course, have been avoided. I very definitely contest the idea that there have not been honest attempts for the peaceful settlement of European problems, very great concessions for Germany, real, honest ideas and programs for the maintenance of peace, and honest representatives of different states who wished to save peace on the basis of justice—justice which never can be perfect and always must be realized step by step in an evolutionary way, without violence. But I do admit that in the critical moments of the last years there have not been governments sufficiently conscious of their real duties, seeing the real substance of events, and understanding the whole European problem. It was simply impossible to settle the most serious European problems by abandoning certain principles or certain nations and through the defense only of the limited national interest of certain states as they conceived them narrowly and selfishly. That is the whole tragedy of Europe. The present failure and tragedy came, and in my opinion a greater tragedy will come inevitably, because of these great and tragic mistakes and failures. The

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whole moral, political, and economic crisis of Europe is just now at the culmination point. The final clash will come sooner or later. I do not know when and in what form. But its inevitability is quite evident to me.

### CONCLUSION

In putting it so clearly before you, I do not prophesy war. I do not know whether war will come or not. I only place the question before you: What can be the final settlement of the European crisis after such a strong and enthusiastic drive for honest settlements until 1930, on the one side, and after such catastrophic failure since 1931, on the other side, after such incredible and repeated successes of the immoral, cynical, and intolerant authoritarian regimes of brute force and after such incredible yieldings and capitulations of the European democracies!

For me there is one thing which is certain. These two kinds of regimes cannot live together. Their coexistence is impossible, and, because dictatorships in history have always been temporary regimes, they will fall. And only after they fall can the question of a new system of collective security be raised. For Europe it will signify again, first of all, security for the small nations. To abandon the small nations would be madness. It would mean only the preparation of a new terrible war, more

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terrible than the last one, and it would be an incredible lack of responsibility if the European statesmen did not understand this. I do not say that the problem of the small nations in central Europe, and in all of Europe, is the only one upon which the question of peace and war depends, but it is one of the most important and fundamental.

The last World War had as one of its greatest achievements the liberation of small nations in the name of democracy. Democracy will again revive in Europe, and the question of small nations will again inevitably play one of the most fundamental roles in the question of permanent peace in Europe, because the question of the small nations cannot be settled without a new system of collective security and without the revival of a new League of Nations.

I do not know if this vision will become reality in the next few years. I am rather inclined to believe that it will be so and that the present crisis and chaos will last but a few years. But I am sure that this vision will surely become a reality, even if Europe is obliged to pass through a period of troubles, disruptions, and sufferings.

Czechoslovakia, which in this period of European crisis has made such enormous sacrifices, which in this great crisis never failed to pursue a policy of honesty, of faithful fulfilment of its engagements to the League of Nations and to other

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countries, which became because of this attitude at the same time the great object of hatred and hostility of the dictatorships as well as the real symbol of the fight for genuine democracy, justice, and honorable peace, will again get justice. Czechoslovakia will be restored, and her independence and security will be more assured, in a Europe more democratic and free, more honest and more faithful. And this new free Europe will be safe, I hope definitely, from the dictatorial poison which today permeates the whole world.

FAREWELL TO SECURITY: GERMANY  
AND THE WORLD, 1919-39

*By ARTHUR FEILER*



## FAREWELL TO SECURITY: GERMANY AND THE WORLD, 1919-39

When we today discuss the post-war relations between Germany and the world, or between the world and Germany, we must, first of all, be aware of one predominant, truly overwhelming fact. We must always bear in mind the absolutely revolutionary situation in which the world finds itself nowadays, indeed has found itself since the beginning of 1933.

The Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Treaty, so brilliantly discussed by Dr. Benes in the preceding lectures of this Institute, now belong to a by-gone past. In their stead we have the Rome-Berlin axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact. And these new pacts and treaties have not only supplanted older agreements by replacing them with others of the same type and character but they have set up in place of the basic ideas of these former attempts at world-organization new principles which proclaim diametrically opposite aims. Peace is no longer their purpose. A redistribution of the world, as Goebbels said, and the building-up of new empires which then shall dominate this newly distributed world—these are their goals.

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Such indeed is this new revolutionary age of ours. It has left far behind even the idea of the national state and still farther all the concepts of collective security, of outlawry of war, of a League of Nations as a community of free and equal states. The new revolutionary forces set in motion by fascism, with German National Socialism as its protagonist, have so completely superseded all those pre-1933 ideas and ideals that to think in their terms appears today a task only for the historian but no longer for the statesman. During the twenties these ideas were the progressive ones, destined, as it was hoped, to bring about and determine the character of a new age. Today, they are a conservative creed—in the same sense in which the ideas of democracy and civil liberty appear to be conservative when compared with the revolutionary trends and doctrines that aim to destroy them. And it may prove not without importance to emphasize here also this change in the character and meaning of words. “Progressivism” and “conservatism” are terms, like many others of the same kind, that have very little meaning by themselves in a revolutionary period like ours; what they may mean in reality depends entirely upon the goal to which one wants to progress and upon what one desires to conserve. We must think over anew every concept and every word in order to find out the real values behind them; this is one of the

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main obligations forced upon us by the revolution that we are witnessing.

Most of all, our world must be warned against making the same mistake in which many “progressive” Germans persisted for many years. They refused to take these revolutionary tendencies seriously because the aims proclaimed by the revolutionists seemed to be so insane, so unbelievable, so unbearable. But it is precisely because of their apparent insanity and unbearability that they must be taken seriously, not only by the nations that are directly concerned but by all peoples of the world.

In fact, they must be a concern of the whole world, even though, at the beginning, they seem in their application to restrict themselves to the domestic affairs of their particular nations and despite the fact that it is loudly proclaimed that they are not an article of export. Even so they afflict every other nation as well. For they are an assault upon the very essence of Europe, against the spiritual, political, and social values which the best minds of Europe have striven for through the centuries, against the whole concept and content of what we are wont to call Western civilization—which truly belongs not to the European nations alone but to America as well. In fact, this is one of the reasons why the fascist revolutionary cannot maintain that restriction of his

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ideological attack to the internal life of the countries where it originates. His countries must expand. We now know that. If we did not understand it earlier, we have learned it since the events of 1938.

Germans know also another decisive fact, one which they can understand much more easily than other peoples. They know that, in spite of all attempts at collective security, there has been no real peace since 1914. For the World War did not end in 1918. Ever since its outbreak Europe has been and still is engaged in a second Thirty Years' War which may last much longer than thirty years. This continuous European civil war is really nothing but another World War, no matter whether it is fought in China or in Spain, in Ethiopia or in central Europe or anywhere else.

Germans are better prepared than other peoples to feel this continuity. For they have now undergone this ordeal for twenty-five years without any end in sight—the older generation with the feeling that their lives have been cut off from an order which to many seems all the more glamorous because it is so definitely gone; the younger generation, men and women of thirty-five or thirty years and less, with no memory whatever of conditions which other peoples are accustomed to call normal. For the German people only the short years from

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1924 to 1928 had even a resemblance to such normalcy.

For a better understanding of our problem permit me therefore briefly to recapitulate the well-known sequence of facts for the period under discussion. The first period from 1919 to 1923 was, as far as Germany was concerned, nothing but a continuation of the war with other means. In Versailles the German delegates for the negotiations of the peace treaty—I was there with them and drafted the German answer to the economic and financial demands of the Allied powers—were kept behind barbed wires like prisoners of war. There were no negotiations. Day by day the German delegation sent to the Allies memorandums ending with the request: “Let us have an oral discussion about the terms because in that manner alone can we reach a reasonable agreement.” All these requests were simply brushed aside. There was never a discussion. The victors were afraid of finding their painfully achieved accord endangered as soon as they allowed the Germans to explain their views. The peace was dictated, ruthlessly imposed upon a defeated people. But even then there was no peace. Important parts of Germany remained occupied by foreign armies. Germany was ordered to pay an immense war indemnity, the amount of which was not even fixed. Again and again the victors issued ultimatums, imposed sanc-

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tions, occupied further parts of German territory. Finally, this occupation was extended to the Ruhr district, the most important center of Germany's heavy industry. Germany's answer was passive resistance. However, the result was only the ultimate collapse of the German currency, one American dollar eventually equaling 4,200 billion marks. The fateful effects of this inflationary destruction did not become fully manifest until later. That happened when those broad strata of society which had lost their savings, their small fortunes and with them their feeling of security and their belief in the justice of the existing social order, took their revenge. Most significant of all, large parts of the so-called lower middle classes suffered destruction by the inflation; they in the early thirties turned against the state, against society, they joined the National Socialist propaganda and helped Hitler to destroy that state and that society. But this is a later story. In 1923 the complete destruction of the German currency was only the symbol of another German defeat. The passive resistance in the Ruhr conflict had ended in starvation, despair, and a complete breakdown.

There can be no doubt that both sides share in the responsibility for these developments, and I certainly do not want to deny the German share. German semimilitary organizations found their satisfaction in playing with concealed arms and

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other soldier-like activities, which were completely valueless in themselves but furnished the victors with causes or pretexts for new oppressions. Some German industrialists acted in a similar way. In fact, the occupation of the Ruhr was eventually motivated by some German arrears in lumber deliveries, completely insignificant in themselves, especially when compared with the real and earnest efforts of the German government itself to comply with the Allied demands for reparation.

Most of all, the German government was a weak government. It did not have the strength to overcome the resistance of these private groups and of other remnants of the past. It was weak also in its financial policy, thus permitting the runaway inflation to take its fateful course. But, conceding all this, it must be stated nevertheless that for that period the main responsibility for the ultimate breakdown of any security rests with the victors. France especially—the France of Clemenceau and of Poincaré—wanted at that time not collective security but only security for herself. She felt her security menaced by the very fact of the survival of an undivided Germany, “twenty million Germans too many.”

Germany, on the other hand, the governments of the German Republic and the great majority of the German people in those years immediately following the war, was truly dedicated to a policy

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of fulfilment. The idea was this: The Treaty of Versailles has been signed by Germany. Well, let us try how it may work. We will do everything in our power to live up to its stipulations. Especially we will pay whatever we can for reparations. This readiness to do whatever is possible will then induce the victors to renounce the impossible. Evidently Germany at that time wanted peace, not revenge. She honestly no longer believed in force but in co-operation. She saw in disarmament not a punishment but a great future possibility. She longed not for power but for reconstruction, for the reconstruction of Germany, of Europe, of the Western world. She understood that the paramount task of the future of this Western world was to solve its immense and continually growing social problems. And she felt that by doing her part at home for increasing freedom, justice, and the dignity of man not only in the political but also in the socioeconomic field she also contributed to that collective security which she sought to attain.

Finally, with the end of the Ruhr conflict these ideas gained momentum. There followed the second post-war period from 1924 to 1929. The Dawes Plan in 1924 was the first attempt at an economic solution of the reparation problem. It resulted in the first foreign loan to Germany, badly needed for economic rehabilitation. And in 1925 there came Locarno. The idea of a real peace treaty, of

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a reconciliation between Germany and France, so much discussed since 1921, now became a reality. There was to be no war again at the Rhine. Instead, there should be arbitration. For the first time European statesmen conceived again the idea that there should be something like a Europe. The negotiations lasted from February until December. But when finally the signatures were put on the document, the peoples of the European continent hopefully sensed the beginning of a new era. Stresemann emphasized the community of fate that chains us one to the other. Briand called the agreement the draft of a constitution for the European family of nations within the League of Nations. The German public in its great majority celebrated the Locarno Treaty as the real peace treaty. For the first time peace had not been dictated but negotiated. Seven years after the armistice, eleven years after the outbreak of the war, this at last had been achieved. The following year saw Germany become a member of the League of Nations. And in 1928 Germany consented without reservations to the Kellogg Pact by which war as an instrument of national policy was condemned as being against the law. On August 27 Stresemann went to Paris to sign the pact, the first German minister who had done so since 1871.

The high hopes of those years, however, materialized only in part. Still the Rhineland was

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occupied; it was freed only in 1929. Still the reparation problem was unsolved. Even the Young Plan of 1929 did not bring a definite solution. It was bound to break down. The year in which it was signed marked also the beginning of the world economic crisis which destroyed the whole basis of all its calculations. As a whole, the division of Europe, the distinction between victors and vanquished, did continue. The victorious countries did not disarm. For them the League of Nations was much less a real organization of the world for definite peace than an instrument for maintaining the status created by the peace treaties. The League of Nations itself did not find a way for solving the problem of peaceful change, although the necessity for such a solution was recognized ever more widely. For, to quote Professor Jessup, "the stabilization of peace cannot be identified with the stabilization of the *status quo*."<sup>1</sup> Or, in the words of David Mitrany:

The present tendency leans heavily in the direction of strengthening the means for the maintenance of the existing state of things . . . . the League or any other international body would thus acquire increasingly the role of a policeman and lose increasingly the merits of a government; until, if carried far enough, such an evolution would end by causing

<sup>1</sup> *Collective Security*, ed. Maurice Bourguin (League of Nations, International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation [Paris, 1936]), p. 17.

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the League to degenerate into another Holy Alliance. Stagnation would then be the rule, and revolution the outcome.<sup>2</sup>

Revolution *was* the outcome. I cannot here discuss in detail the causes for National Socialism's rise to power. Certainly Germany's position in the world was only one of the causes of that development, but it was one of its causes. Germany's humiliation in Versailles and the long delay of the necessary concessions by the victors gave Hitler a powerful weapon for propaganda. It made him sure of success, when he called the post-war period the fourteen years of "dishonor and disgrace," when he proclaimed the "liberation of the German people" as his supreme goal. Tardily this fact was recognized by the great European powers themselves, when they finally conceded to Hitler what they had always refused to the unfortunate German Republic, thus helping to increase Hitler's prestige to the same extent as formerly they had damaged the prestige of German democracy.

After the death of Stresemann there was still an interlude from 1929 to 1932. But the rising tide of German nationalism marked that period. Its strength came into the open for the first time when the German government decided to sign the Young Plan. Dr. Schacht supported the nationalistic propaganda against this plan which he himself had helped to negotiate. Dr. Brüning also thought it

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 212.

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necessary to bow to this ever growing nationalism. When the great depression shook the German, as every other, economy in its foundations, he concentrated all his efforts on abolishing the reparations, instead of acting for the six million Germans unemployed and instead of fighting for economic betterment. But the economic crisis, ultimately leading to the complete social dissolution, decided the issue: On January 30, 1933, Hitler was appointed chancellor. The dream of the German Republic was ended and with it the idea of collective security.

For the years since Hitler's coming to power I shall again confine myself to a brief summary of the facts that are in everyone's memory. Germany declares herself no longer bound by the restrictions of armaments imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany sends troops into the demilitarized Western Zone. Germany leaves the disarmament conference and the League of Nations. Germany rearms to an extent unthinkable some years before. Indeed, Germany achieves a totalitarian war preparedness, a totalitarian mobilization. For this is the primary goal of the totalitarian state. For this purpose it subjugates everything to the new leviathan, "state": the whole people and all its life, labor and capital, production and consumption, thoughts and feelings. For this purpose it establishes autarchy. As a matter of fact, for the

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totalitarian state the whole people and every part of its economy is nothing but a *potentiel de guerre*.

And, when finally this totalitarian war preparedness has been achieved, National Socialism enters its second stage. Germany conquers Austria, and it was a real conquest, treating the Austrian population not as co-nationals, coming back to their homeland, but as a conquered people, dominated and exploited by the conqueror. Germany conquers the Sudeten Germans, and somewhat later Memel. Germany enslaves Czechoslovakia, finally transforming Bohemia and Moravia into a German protectorate.

Thus suddenly we have a peaceful change, a change of state boundaries without overt war, a development previously considered impossible. However, the destruction of Czechoslovakian independence is all the more significant because here the naked conquest is no longer concealed by the fiction of a German population reunited with its motherland. It is a foreign nationality which against its will is being compelled to submit to foreign domination. Obviously this method of peaceful change cannot be considered as a new system of collective security. On the contrary, it is indicative of the stage of complete totalitarian insecurity which we have entered.

As a matter of fact, there is no reason at all for the belief that we have now reached the end of this

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development. Rather we must assume that so far we have seen only its beginning. Witness to this is borne, for example, by Hermann Rauschning in his book *The Revolution of Nihilism*. The author was formerly a member of the National Socialist party. As such he was president of the Danzig Senate. Actually he is what may be called a nationalistic conservative. His book, whatever else may be thought about it, is particularly instructive for our problem of National Socialism's foreign policy, because it is based on the official literature on this topic and supplemented by personal utterances of the leading men.

The result of these and other revelations is that National Socialism, as I said at the beginning, really aims at nothing less than world-revolution. For these are Rauschning's conclusions concerning National Socialism's ultimate goals: The control over the world is to be organized anew. It is to be divided between Germany, Italy, and England, if England is ready to withdraw from Europe—or against England, if she tries to resist. But, at all events, in the end the other empires too are to be overpowered by Germany. And the final outcome is to be a world dominated by National Socialism. In the meantime huge plans for the formation of the German empire as such are conceived. They culminate, according to Rauschning, in the idea of German rule from Vlissingen to Vladivostok, from

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the Netherlands all through northern Europe and Asia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Indeed, the pre-war idea Berlin-Bagdad, or the later concept of Middle Europe and the like, sound like a poor provincialism in comparison with such a far-flung fantasy.

There we stand today with all our thinking about the essence of imperialism. Much scholarly intelligence and zeal have been employed in the effort for the economic interpretation of this phenomenon. Imperialism, thus runs the theory, is to be explained by, and is the ultimate result of, the development of the capitalist system. This development is said to lead to an ever growing pressure for markets for industrial overproduction and for the investment of idle capital. If these markets for goods and capital can no longer be found by peaceful means, then the only way out is expansion by force. Consequently, it is the economic development that is held responsible for the growing tendency toward imperialism and imperialistic wars. Modern capitalist imperialism says Jesus and means calico; while claiming to bring culture and civilization to backward people, its real aim, according to that economic interpretation, is economic advantages.

Modern National Socialist imperialist writers, in fact, say calico. They like to plead that Germany is in need of raw materials and food and of markets

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for her industrial production and of land for her population. But, while thus emphasizing economic needs, they really mean something entirely different. To be sure, it would be fruitless to try that economic interpretation of the imperialistic longing of National Socialism. Instead National Socialist imperialism can be explained only as a political phenomenon, indicating the superiority of politics over economics. It leads us back to what Schumpeter called aggression for the sake of aggression, expansion for the sake of expansion, domination for the sake of domination, and power for the sake of power. This is precisely what National Socialism is striving for. It wants power within the state for the ruling clique. But at the same time this state itself shall be powerful, overwhelmingly strong and through this strength expanding all over the world. And this power, this strength, this expansion of the state shall then be the reward of the individual citizen for all the sacrifices that it asks him to make, for the spiritual sacrifices and for the economic sacrifices as well. In other words, National Socialism is basically founded on non-economic, anti-economic, anti-materialistic reasoning. It prides itself on conquests even if they are not accompanied by economic advantages but lead only to increased burdens to be borne by the people.

Indeed, it is just in this appeal to anti-economic,

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anti-rational sentiments and resentments that the explanation of the propagandistic force and success of National Socialism must to a very large extent be found—and certainly not in Germany alone. At a time when economic insecurity and distress threaten to make life senseless and worthless for large sections of the people everywhere, one must understand the enormous allurement of such doctrines. Under such conditions, armament, the production of means of destruction, readily offers itself as the best way out of unemployment. And to divert the despair of a people from economic endeavors to the new religion of the irrational power of the deified state is then an easy task for the clever demagogue.

The National Socialist leaders, however, are not only very clever demagogues but also immensely shrewd politicians. They know perfectly well how to employ the artifices of both in order to weaken their adversaries. They are not satisfied by having destroyed all instruments of collective security. Their world-revolution goes farther. It aims at destroying also internal security everywhere in the world. A simple means to this end is the fight against democracy by the use, rather by the abuse, of democracy itself. They abuse democratic principles. For the destruction of Czechoslovakia, for instance, they appealed to the self-determination of peoples or to the rights of the minorities, only to

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renounce these principles as soon as they had accomplished their purpose. They abuse democratic institutions. They arrange plebiscites, or caricatures of plebiscites, if they feel sure of being able to determine in advance the results by compulsion and terror, while, for good reason, they omit taking recourse to this democratic instrument in the case of Bohemia and Moravia. They abuse democratic methods of international collaboration by readily concluding international pacts and treaties, but always with the mental reservation that they may break them just as readily and unhesitatingly. They abuse democratic liberties by using them to undermine the political life of foreign countries through propaganda abroad. Rauschning, for instance, quotes utterances of Hanfstaengel and others to the effect that democracies are unable to defend themselves against such a policy of universal disturbance—utterances which should be studied very carefully by the Dies Committee. They abuse the fear of communism in capitalistic democracies by presenting themselves as the world's saviors from communism—though in fact it is becoming more evident every day that in spite of all the deep ideological contrasts between the two the differences between their socioeconomic systems are diminishing more and more—so much so that in the socioeconomic sphere National Socialism must really be understood as being “the

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present-day German version of present-day Russian Bolshevism."<sup>3</sup> They abuse even the doctrines and slogans of proletarian socialism. They simply transfer its theory of the class struggle into the international life by emphasizing the antagonism between the have and the have-not nations and proclaiming that the struggle of the latter is the true socialism of our days. They really abuse everything and especially the spoken and the written word. They have transformed enlightenment into propaganda. They are not ashamed of any lie; on the contrary, they employ falsehood with unsurpassable cynicism, thus, e.g., first disavowing any participation of Germany in the Spanish civil war and later pompously celebrating this participation officially with great pride. All these devices serve their purpose of creating totalitarian insecurity. They weaken the energy of resistance everywhere, while at the same time augmenting the strength of the dictatorial ruler. For he is not responsible to anyone. If he does not want to raise a particular issue, it simply does not exist by the very fact that he forbids its public discussion. On the other hand, if he wants to break loose, he can conceal his intentions until the last moment and may then act with the quickness of lightning.

Does all this mean, then, that National Socialist

<sup>3</sup> See for this point, and for the whole analysis of National Socialism in this paper, Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?* (New York, 1938).

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Germany wants war? Not necessarily. There has been no war so far for all of Hitler's great conquests. And he doubtless will continue to do anything in his power toward attaining his further aims by the same means. We may even say that Hitler has every reason for being afraid of a war with other great powers. He must be afraid of arming his domestic foes. He must be afraid of losing his present godlike position if it is put to the decisive test. Most of all, he must be afraid of being defeated. In fact, it is hard to conceive that Germany could go into a great war in her present state of strain, with her insufficient supplies of food and materials, with her lack of gold or foreign exchange, with her inflation scarcely concealed and actually growing quickly at least since 1936, with her whole economy working under a tension which in the World War was probably reached only after the two first years of the struggle.

On the other hand, we must be very cautious in drawing from these facts conclusions which easily may prove to be too reasonable, too rationalistic, and therefore wrong. Hitler may not want war. But as a consequence he may continue to concentrate his assaults on smaller nations while trying to keep out the great powers. Hitler may not want war. But as a consequence he may continue to use the threat of war instead, and he will certainly do so as long as, by the threat of war, he can achieve

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the same or even greater results. Hitler may not want war. However, he understands perfectly well that there can be no war at any time and for any cause unless there is, on the other side of the fence, someone else who is ready to go to war; and he also knows that all the others are afraid of a war infinitely more than he is or ought to be. This knowledge has so far been the real basis of his superiority, of his successes. For, while he may not want war, he certainly despises more than anything else pacifism, a policy of peace at any price, which, for those who adhere to it, may mean peace at the price of liberty and complete abdication. What he really aspires to are power and expansion. For these he is ready to pay any price, to take all chances, to run all risks. And this readiness makes him stronger than the others—makes him appear stronger than he really is. The result is the totalitarian insecurity of our days. And the price that must be paid for this insecurity can be gauged from the figures for armament expenditures. During the current year the great powers of the world are expected to spend for armaments about seven times as much as they did in 1932, the year before Hitler's access to power. While taxes and debts rise everywhere, all nations are compelled to work hard, not for improving their standards of living, but for their naked defense.

This is the farewell to security brought on by

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the National Socialist revolution. However, we must not forget that the decay of collective security had started long before its totalitarian revolutionary breakdown; that, as a matter of fact, collective security has always been not more than a hope, never a reality. In probing for the prospects of the future, we must therefore not confine ourselves to the question of whether there will be peace or war. This present peace is no real peace at all. And another war would lead to inconceivable destruction: Who feels able to foretell what, after another world-war, there would still remain of Western civilization?

War or no war, if we have not already entered a new dark age, if there be still a hope for a future at all, its foundation can be found only in a positive alternative to be set against the pernicious forces of fascism. That is to say, it cannot suffice to cultivate one's own nationalism against theirs. It cannot suffice to simply defend the *status quo*, the British Empire, or whatever else. Most of all, it would be disastrous to repeat, on a larger scale, the horrible blunders of Versailles. What we need is a concept of a new order of the world and above all a concept of a real organization of Europe, so sadly lacking now. Moreover, if we want to survive as what we are, we must revitalize, against the fanaticism of force and suppression, the belief in those values that are the great heritage of Europe

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and America, and that fascism is bent on destroying. A newly strengthened belief in liberty, justice, and the inalienable rights of man—"a new birth of freedom"—this alone can help us also to peace and good will among the nations and to a real collective security.

But what about Germany? I was supposed to discuss Germany and the world from 1919 to 1939. I feel that in the second part of this lecture I have not spoken of Germany but only of those who have conquered and subjugated her since 1933, just as they threaten to conquer and subjugate others also. Now *they* proclaim that *they* are Germany. But they are not! They are only the destroyers of Germany. Rather they would destroy Germany if they could. As yet they have not been able to destroy her. For they cannot destroy that real Germany that is alive in the grand tradition of her achievements in all fields of human culture throughout the centuries. This Germany is invisible today. Yet it survives in the hearts of nameless men and women who have not surrendered to the barbarism of their present rulers. They live in the belief that a time will come when they again will be the real representatives of the real Germany. And then a new chapter will begin for our topic—"Germany and the World," telling a story of real collaboration between a Germany reborn and a new and better world.



A FAREWELL TO LEADERSHIP: BRITAIN  
AND THE WORLD, 1919-39

*By RUSHTON COULBORN*



## A FAREWELL TO LEADERSHIP: BRITAIN AND THE WORLD, 1919-39

I have listened with the sincerest admiration to the restraint Dr. Beneš has imposed upon himself in the first two lectures in this series. I felt, in listening to him, no small apprehension and even a sense of shame that I had not planned to do likewise myself. After careful reflection I have decided to speak with brutal frankness—for two reasons: (1) that criticism of Britain ought to be voiced by an Englishman—the world ought to be told plainly what many British people are now admitting to themselves; and (2) that I am myself much subject to that academic fury which sometimes possesses professors and ought not to seek to hide my character from you.

In the last century you had a peace system which was the outgrowth of British experience during the Napoleonic and other previous wars [and] which prevented world war for a century. It was based on the simple truth that if the British people made their islands an invulnerable base by maintaining an invincible fleet with naval bases all over the world which would enable it to sink or drive into port any hostile fleet anywhere there would be no serious risk of world war. . . . The *Pax Britannica* depended on . . . a Britain which was Liberal, and therefore used its power in such a way that it did not challenge the vital interests of other powers.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> "The United States and Europe," *International Affairs*, XVIII, No. 3 (London: May-June, 1939), 331-32.

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Those are the words of Lord Lothian, who will in a few months' time become British ambassador in Washington. I would add to Lord Lothian's words that Britain's experience also showed that she had to maintain a situation on the Continent of Europe in which no one power could establish hegemony. Britain's own world-hegemony, in other words, rested not only upon her fleet but also upon a balance of power on the Continent. The English Channel served, before the days of the submarine and the airplane, as a marvelous moat to protect the British castle, but it was necessary to procure at the same time that there should always be a Continental power ready to attack in the rear any other Continental power which tried to cross the moat.

By contrast with this picture there was set up in 1919 an entirely new system based upon a theory devised in part and advocated by Mr. Woodrow Wilson. In this system Britain retained and even increased her world-wide possessions, but the protection of the peace devolved upon a society which was intended eventually to include all the nations of the earth. If I were considering the foreign policy of Britain as it was in the nineteenth century before the League of Nations was created, I should find it convenient to cover the world by proceeding from one geographical area to another, treating piecemeal the fundamental question of

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Britain's function as world-policeman. But in the new world of the twentieth century the fundamental problem of maintaining the peace has become a burning question, and the balance of power in Europe, more essential to peace than ever before, has become intimately involved in the League of Nations; I am therefore going to devote almost all my attention to Britain's policy in Europe, where the chief nations of the League are located.

At the same time it is necessary to pause for a moment to take note of two things: the increase in British possessions in the Near East in 1919 and the adoption by Britain of a new policy in the Far East in 1922. Of the former I will say only that even in Palestine up to about 1935 I think Britain both guarded her own interests well and discharged her duties to others in the Liberal spirit cited by Lord Lothian. With Arabs, Turks, and Egyptians she has, to paraphrase Sir Eyre Crowe, promoted her own liberty and security by promoting the liberty and security of others. As to her policy since the Ethiopian problem arose, that will have its place in my main discussion.

The new British policy in the Far East was adopted at the Washington Conference in 1922 at the earnest desire of the United States. It involved abandonment of the old British alliance with Japan and at the same time a restriction of naval bases. Thus it inevitably implied a reduction of Britain's

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power to play policeman for herself and for others. It likewise involved a real and effective recognition of the integrity of China and the renditon to China as soon as feasible of those extraterritorial rights of which Britain had so many and the United States so few. The theory was, of course, that the League of Nations became policeman in the Far East as everywhere else. Now, although the League has utterly failed in that capacity in the Far East, I do not think the new British policy of 1922 was wholly an error. The truth is that, without an ally to bear the main burden, Britain never was able satisfactorily to look after either herself or any other nation in the Far East, and during the World War Japan proved herself an untrustworthy associate where the rights of others were concerned. I shall explain toward the end of this discourse that I think Britain today is even less able to perform her old duties in the Far East than she was before 1914. It follows that the Washington policy was wrong in two particulars: the first that the United States did not overtly and clearly take over a part of Britain's far eastern rights and duties; the second that both the United States and Britain accepted Japan's word for her good behavior and agreed to make it difficult for themselves to intervene.

To turn to Europe: it is remarkable how, until very recently, Britain's new policy has either

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ignored or strangely misapplied the old policy of the balance of power. The British Labour party, as champions of the League of Nations, assumed that the League would look after the Continent, thus taking over not only the main task of guarding the peace, but also the contributory task of preventing a Continental hegemony. The Conservative party, often suspicious or indifferent toward the League, seems for a long time to have assumed that the Continental powers were too weak to matter any more—if indeed the Conservative party thought sufficiently to have any assumptions at all. Whichever way you look at it, whether as a Labourite or as a Conservative, you find until very recently a marked desire to make an end of the old British responsibility. The Conservative, professing himself a realist, was likely to say that the center of gravity of the world's power had shifted to the Pacific, thus involving new responsibility for the United States, Canada, and Australia; the emphasis upon shift of the center of gravity implied that the responsibility of the Pacific powers was greater than British responsibility. The Labourite, professing himself an idealist, spoke of the dispersion of power and the collectivization of responsibility.

The first part of this examination of Britain's policy on the Continent of Europe will concern the period from 1919 to 1929 with an occasional

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glance forward at events after the latter date. It is the period which contains the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, and, in 1925, the Locarno treaties. After those last it is rather an empty period where British policy is concerned, for the nations were enjoying the so-called post-war prosperity and, although Briand and others were striving to build up a new system of politics, Mr. Baldwin's government, then ruling Britain, was non-co-operative. In some sort the French maintained a Continental hegemony during this period and continued to do so until the rise of Hitler in 1933. This in itself signalizes the non-committal attitude which Britain had come to assume. There were, of course, occasions on which the British intervened: the most energetic intervention was in 1924 when the French, having occupied the Ruhr in the year previous, were seeking to detach the Rhineland from Germany and set up a buffer state under their own aegis. British action discredited this plan, and it was abandoned. But the British had not prevented the Ruhr occupation itself, although they were greatly opposed to it. At a much later date, in 1931, the Weimar Republic tried to bring about a customs union with Austria on a basis of mutual consent by the two countries. The British government favored this idea, in spite of the obvious fact that it might lead to the *Anschluss* between Germany and Austria;

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indeed the British government, then a Labour government, favored the *Anschluss* also in pre-Hitler days, although it was forbidden in the Treaty of Versailles. The customs union suggestion was a suitable occasion for the British to declare themselves, but they hesitated to do so and ultimately stood aside while the French prevented the customs union virtually by financial blackmail.

These are examples of British action and inaction in the direct relations of Germany and France. In almost all other matters concerned with the French hegemony the British played an entirely passive part. It was in these other matters that British governments began to proclaim from the housetops their disinterestedness in eastern Europe, although they bore at least as great a responsibility for the "Balkanization" of that territory as other nations which participated in the Congress of Versailles. Some of the most important of the frontiers of eastern Europe were settled by sheer aggression. Examples of this are the Polish-German frontier in Upper Silesia, the Polish-Russian frontier, the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, the Rumanian-Russian frontier, and the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier. France exercised considerable influence in these settlements, and, at any rate where Polish aggression is concerned, she behaved as accessory after the fact.

From about 1924 a series of bitter disputes arose

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between France and Italy about relations with the nations of southeastern Europe. These disputes, for which France is little to blame, continued right on until the eve of the Ethiopian affair. Britain supinely permitted this estrangement to develop.

It was the unwillingness of Britain to take action on the European continent which led to a movement, sponsored mainly by the small powers of Europe, to make sure that the League of Nations was really an adequate substitute for the old *Pax Britannica*. And thereupon there developed a strange phenomenon: it began to appear in the League's transactions that the League itself—or rather those states which composed it—expected the British to go on bearing on the League's behalf some of those responsibilities which the British hoped they had escaped. Thus the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance—actually Lord Cecil's proposal—was put forward in 1922 to remedy a weakness in the Covenant, where it did not make clear enough how sanctions were to work against an aggressor. By the Draft Treaty action against an aggressor was to be taken by the states of the Continent where the aggression had occurred. When interpreted in practical terms, this meant that the British, who had possessions in every continent, would have to act against each and every aggressor. The British government first shuffled about the independent rights of the

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Dominions and then definitely killed the proposal.

Some months later Mr. Ramsay MacDonald himself produced a plan to strengthen the League—the Geneva Protocol. Mr. MacDonald was honest enough to feel the justice of the accusation, made freely in 1923 and 1924 by small nations, that Britain, while herself seeking the benefits of the League, was endeavoring to elude the responsibilities which her great power enabled her to bear. The Protocol endeavored to clear up all doubts in the identification of an aggressor, but did not introduce anything new to define those obligated to suppress him, since this had failed in the case of the Draft Treaty. Had Mr. MacDonald remained in power, the Protocol would very probably have been accepted; but at the critical juncture Mr. Baldwin took over, and he and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, in the face of very wide support by other powers, rejected the Protocol. Again the sovereign rights of the British Dominions were paraded; but, if this plea had had a semblance of validity in the affair of the Draft Treaty, it amounted in that of the Protocol to a more or less plain statement that Britain and her Dominions did not care to have aggressors identified because they did not want to have to fight them.

The following year, 1925, Mr. Austen Chamberlain produced the Locarno treaties, stung to ac-

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tion by the uproar which followed the rejection of the Geneva Protocol. It may be suggested that Locarno looks like a British scheme to balance France and Germany against each other permanently and free herself once for all of the embarrassment of looking after the European continent. If that be a slight exaggeration, it is substantially true. The old British way of maintaining the Continental balance in the nineteenth century had been to ally with the weaker side, thus keeping it dependent upon British support and at the same time making the other side, which had been the stronger, the weaker. The vital part of the Locarno treaties laid down that Britain guaranteed the Franco-German and the Belgo-German frontiers—in other words, that Britain would fight against France or Germany if either attacked the other or attacked Belgium. This seems to be a scheme to keep both sides equally weak and equally dependent on British support—a static equilibrium instead of a dynamic balance—Britain thus being freed of the need for active intervention. In addition Britain once again disclaimed all responsibility in eastern Europe. This disclaimer took the form of agreements at Locarno between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia, to which Britain was not a party.

This attitude was maintained by Mr. Baldwin and his government while they remained in office,

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but in 1929 Mr. Ramsay MacDonald succeeded Mr. Baldwin, and a new period began, lasting roughly until the rise of Hitler in 1933. Mr. MacDonald's policy, which dominated the period, was to make the power of the League a reality in a juridical sense and to rely sincerely upon the League to keep the peace. If Mr. MacDonald deserves praise for his energy in seeking to strengthen the League, his work is open to the criticism that he had no formula worth the name for putting force behind the League and, further, that the emphasis upon collective responsibility of the League members seemed to argue indirectly Britain's rejection of responsibility for herself, which the Conservatives had argued directly.

Mr. MacDonald caused Britain to accede at once to the General Act for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and to the "optional clause" by which disputes were to be referred to The Hague Court. Thus with a firm stroke he erased the shame Britain had incurred by seeming to desire that aggression should not be defined. He thus admitted the French contention that security must precede disarmament and then gave all his energies to promoting disarmament itself. The desideratum, according to Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Henderson, was to get a broad agreement upon armaments among the nations on which collective responsibility for peace could rest.

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Thus Lord Cecil in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission put forward a plan which contained some real disarmament proposals for air forces, but little disarmament otherwise. In 1933 in the actual Disarmament Commission Mr. MacDonald appeared in person with a really business-like plan upon much the same lines; the mass of detail in this plan and its comprehensive character had the merit of producing a tentative answer to every conceivable aspect of the problem both of security and, if not of *disarmament*, at least of balance of armaments. Again Mr. MacDonald did not, as the Conservatives had done, leave the French and Italians to squabble freely. He had already in 1930 in the discussions for the London Naval Treaty tried unsuccessfully to make a bridge between the two countries by pressing them to adhere to the Anglo-American ratio system laid down at Washington in 1922. In his proposals to the Disarmament Commission he returned to this suggestion in the hope that the contending parties would accept it for the sake of the other features of his plan. The Commission actually accepted Mr. MacDonald's whole plan as a working basis for discussion—it was not offered as anything more—and the high-water mark of the post-war security system was reached.

But stern reality was already forcing a way through the billowy structures of cloud-cuckoo

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land. The New York stock market had collapsed almost at the moment when Mr. MacDonald took office; the Young Plan had been swept away, and Germany's new economic system had fallen to pieces; both the United States and Britain had abandoned the gold standard. In Europe as elsewhere the great depression was bringing the world face to face with hard facts. It may be that Mr. MacDonald's very successes would never have been won but for the looming of National Socialist Germany. In September, 1930, 107 Nazis had been elected to the Reichstag and, perhaps as a result, Lord Cecil's proposals to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission had permitted France to exclude trained army reserves from her list of military effectives. Likewise Hitler's appointment as Reich chancellor had preceded and prompted Mr. MacDonald's personal appearance in the Disarmament Commission in 1933. Now, in October, 1933, after Mr. Henderson had made a fairly successful tour of Europe before the next meeting of the Commission, Hitler suddenly announced Germany's withdrawal from the Commission and shortly her resignation from the League and her demand for a conscript army of three hundred thousand men.

Hitler's act exposed the weakness of the League and its system of security and ushered in a new phase of British policy, which lasted until another

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act of Hitler's, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March, 1936. The Conservative party at once took control again at the end of 1933; it was not difficult for them to do this when Hitler removed Mr. MacDonald's *locus standi*, for the Labour government had long ago, in August, 1931, given place to the so-called National government containing a majority of Conservatives, although Mr. MacDonald had remained prime minister. The Conservatives, then, withdrew their tolerance from Mr. MacDonald, and the new phase of policy proved to be a return to Locarno with a difference. The difference was that Hitler's mad career compelled the Conservatives to pay some attention to events on the European continent and thus, haltingly and ineptly, to move in the direction of what they thought was a balance of power. In these two and a half years some of the older Conservatives showed more clearly than at any previous time how little they cared for the League and its system and at the same time how completely they failed to understand either the movement of public opinion in Britain and elsewhere or the realities of politics in terms of sheer power. The world had become dynamic: the release of Germany was the release also of Italy and of active forces everywhere which had been smothered by the weight of the Versailles victory and collectivist theory. Yet Mr. Baldwin and his government, always vaguely op-

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posed to collectivism, utterly failed to appreciate the meaning of its overthrow and still maintained inactivity and drift with the times as their ideal, even though the ideal was, temporarily as they thought, unattainable. Mr. Eden and a very small number of other Conservative leaders soon became uneasy about the policy of drift. They very evidently failed, however, to stir the mass of the inert party to revolt against the old leaders, and, although they made gestures of dissatisfaction, they did not secure predominance in the party even when the Baldwin policy led to crashing disaster between December, 1935, and March, 1936.

The French, on the other hand, led by M. Barthou, spent an immense amount of energy upon a plan for regional nonaggression and security pacts. Mr. Baldwin's government looked on politely but passively, bestirring themselves only to sponsor Russia's admission to the League of Nations in September, 1934, an event which arose out of M. Barthou's campaign. Early in 1934 Hitler embarked on his first and somewhat amateur plan to bring about the *Anschluss*, which ended in the murder of Dolfuss. Britain had joined with France and Italy in February in a declaration against the *Anschluss*, but it was Italy which in March had made the Rome protocols with Austria and with Hungary a positive step toward averting the threat. Similarly it was Mussolini who in July

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made a bellicose speech and backed it with a force of one hundred thousand men at the Brenner Pass. In December, 1934, and January, 1935, Mr. Eden appeared in the more active Conservative role of mediator between France and Germany in the Saar plebiscite.

A number of events early in 1935 caused anxiety in younger Conservative quarters, and in March the government issued a condemnation of Germany's bellicosity, an episode which caused Hitler to catch a "cold." This anxiety increased a little when Hitler announced the existence of a German air force, and a good deal when he went on to announce conscription and a standing German army of five hundred and fifty thousand men. For this the remedy was the Stresa Conference and renewed condemnation of Germany by Great Britain, France, and Italy, though Mussolini was sufficiently ungentlemanly to speak sarcastically of the condemnation and refer crudely to the importance of the Italian army, while Mr. Eden insisted on making a diplomatic journey to Warsaw, Moscow, and Prague after he and Sir John Simon had had a cold reception upon visiting Hitler. In spite of Mr. Eden's anxieties, Mr. Baldwin, Sir John Simon, and the other senior Conservatives were well satisfied with the situation; Hitler's new rearmament plans had followed a French measure doubling the service of currently enlisted con-

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scripts (owing to fall of the birth-rate during the war years); it looked as if a substantive balance were developing between France and Germany. Nor was Mussolini's "realism" displeasing to them; Italy might perhaps stand with France against Germany and thus make it safe for Britain mildly to support a German rearmament to keep the balance of power dressed. If this constituted a departure from the Franco-German static equilibrium, supporting German rearmament had the enormous attraction of permitting Britain to accept the inevitable—to sail comfortably alongside the competitor which was setting the pace.

On May 21 Hitler, having observed the trend of events in British Conservative circles, made a characteristically cunning speech: he declared Germany's intention of standing by the Locarno treaties, which was exactly what Baldwin, Chamberlain, Hoare, and Simon wanted Germany to do, and at the same time he complained about the Franco-Soviet Pact, an instrument which seemed to the Conservative Right Wing to invite Russia to a revolutionary assault upon capitalist institutions. The Tory gentlemen of Downing Street hesitated no longer; in June they accepted Germany's proposal of a bilateral naval treaty and granted Germany 35 per cent of the British navy's tonnage.

This bold action pitched them forthwith into

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another imbroglio which they had yet not contemplated very seriously, namely, the Italian-Ethiopian question. Ever since the fall of 1933 it had been known that Mussolini intended to seek some sort of hold over Ethiopia. The British Conservatives did not bother very much about it then or during 1934, for Mussolini had convinced them as long ago as 1925, when spheres of influence in Ethiopia between Britain and Italy were agreed, that his intentions were honorable toward such British interests as Lake Tsana, upon which the Sudan depended largely for water. They had been disturbed early in 1935 by the mutually corrosive action of Mussolini's tone toward Ethiopia and the tone of certain sections of the British press toward Italy. They had, however, assumed that the Ethiopian problem was something quite minor and could be regulated without much fuss. It would seem that their leading idea was that Italy, in control of Ethiopia, which was an entirely landlocked territory, would not affect British imperial communications through the Red Sea any more than Italy in control of her old territories of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, while a countervailing British control of the Lake Tsana region would be positively advantageous. A transaction of this kind might have been done between the governments of two great powers almost at any time before 1914, and such transactions have, in my opinion, much to

recommend them, provided always that the governments of the great powers concerned conduct their affairs on decently liberal lines and that the government of the primitive country about to be superseded is sufficiently bad. I think the Ethiopian government was within such limits of badness, but it is obvious that Mussolini's Italian government was not one which ought to have been given colonial territory to rule, and the Conservatives ought to have been intelligent and honest enough to see this.

Apart from that the Baldwin government displayed almost complete obliviousness to the change which had come over the world since 1914. There were two things in particular which Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir John Simon, and company did not realize: one was the large increase in the British stake in the Near East since 1919 and the other was the extent to which British and world-opinion were attracted by the ideals of the collective system. The latter, largely because Ethiopia had been made a member of the League of Nations, made an old-fashioned protectorate transaction in Ethiopia out of the question for the government of the modern British democracy. The former, which ought more readily to have appealed to the Conservative mind, introduced into any transaction so near to the Arab countries a new element of risk in addition to the

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risk to imperial communications. This risk was that the introduction of European rule into Ethiopia created a precedent for change and therefore jeopardized the future of such states as the Yemen, even Saudi Arabia itself, the newly emancipated Iraq, even perhaps Egypt, which had for long been clamoring for a larger measure of freedom from British control. The state system of the Near East was extremely new and not by any means stable, and states as far away as the new Turkey and reformed Persia, though most of them had their minor disputes with Britain, looked upon the British as the main authors of the post-war situation and as the guarantors of its security. British popularity and prestige were at stake in the whole Near East.

All these obvious British interests as well as the strength and character of contemporary British opinion the leading Conservatives either ignored or failed to understand. It would be charitable to them to say that their failure to appreciate the gravity of the issues explains their firm determination to take no risk of hostilities or anything approaching hostilities. Yet I have a feeling that such charity would be unjustifiably merciful; their unwillingness to act appears to me to lie deeper, in the paralytic inertia into which the pre-war British mind fell in the face of post-war realities.

Mussolini made a similar miscalculation about

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British and world-opinion, though he was fully alive to the more palpable matter of the near eastern situation. The reason for his miscalculations was a more personal one: he made the time-honored error of supposing that everyone else was as wicked as himself. If he had any doubts of this, they were removed as far as the Baldwin government was concerned by the Anglo-German naval treaty of June, 1935. That is why that transaction pitched the Baldwin government into the Ethiopian imbroglio. In July Mussolini, who had been pretending to arbitrate in order to gain time for military preparations, threw off the mask and refused further negotiations. At almost the same moment the British League of Nations Union, which was rightly suspicious of Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare, held the nation-wide British Peace Ballot whereby they got *inter alia* virtually unanimous votes for supporting the League of Nations and for economic sanctions against an aggressor and a three-to-one vote for military sanctions. Verily Mr. Baldwin was between the devil and the deep sea.

To stop the rot, the British government had already in June rushed Mr. Eden to Rome with a strip of British Somaliland in his pocket to effect a three-cornered transaction whereby the strip would go to Ethiopia and a portion of Ethiopia would go to Italy—their first attempt at an old-

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fashioned deal. Mussolini turned it down. The League of Nations thereupon took up the issue seriously and appointed Britain and France to settle it. In August Mussolini rejected their proposals. On September 11 Sir Samuel Hoare, thinking to recapture the public good will, roared like a lion about Britain's intention of honoring her undertakings to the League. To those who knew, it was clear that this was the first time he had realized that his government had to pay that much attention to public opinion, and it soon became very evident that they still underestimated the depth and steadfastness of that opinion, being completely insulated against it by their own mentality. There was indeed a mouselike squeak as antiphon to Sir Samuel's roars, namely, that Britain's championship must be matched by that of other nations. On the third of October the Italian attack on Ethiopia began; on the seventh the League declared Italy the aggressor; on the tenth Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval came to an agreement that nothing should be done under guise of sanctions which might lead to war—note the rapid succession of events. It was a short step, though it took a long time, from that to the crowning folly, the Hoare-Laval Peace Plan. Mussolini had proved inaccessible to reason, and therefore Hoare and Laval tried unreason: they proposed to give Mussolini about two-thirds of Ethiopia, not

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because they feared he would conquer it anyway, but because they feared he would not, that he would be discredited and that Italy would cease to be a support for France against Germany; to the Baldwin government this would upset the delightful policy of a balance of power between Germany, on the one hand, and France and Italy, on the other, with Britain comfortably affording mild support to Germany.

The howl of rage which greeted the imbecilic diplomacy of the Baldwin government swept away Sir Samuel Hoare, but, even if it had swept them all away, it would have been too late to cheat nemesis from over the Rhine. Hitler and his able ambassador in Rome, von Hassell, cannily waited until the Battle of Amba Aradam in February, 1936, when it became virtually certain that Italy would conquer Ethiopia, barring military and naval intervention against her, and then effected the initial axis agreement. On March 7, with that agreement behind him, Hitler marched his troops into the Rhineland.

The Baldwin-Hoare policy thereupon fell in ruins. Strong action by Britain against Italy at almost any moment in the latter part of 1935 would have made Germany a British client possibly for some years, and a measure of success would have attended Baldwin's policy. It may be perhaps that that would not have been best for

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Britain or for the world, for it would have meant a continuance of the schism between the British government and its public, which had just declared itself anew in an election in November. The public itself was not shocked by the remilitarization of the Rhineland, but it was puzzled, and from that moment began slowly to realize that force was again near the surface of international politics and that Britain would have to prepare to take on responsibilities once more.

As for the government, it clung blindly to office and was for long an ass unpolicied. While the Germans and Italians sidetracked the burning issue of Austria and got behind the Spanish rebels, Mr. Neville Chamberlain was rising to eminence. Mr. Chamberlain was and is an amateur in politics and a bad one at that. He is really of the old gang, though his lack of experience enabled him to pose in 1936 as a moderate whom both those of the Baldwin era and those of the Eden persuasion could follow. Moderate he was with a vengeance, and the new policy which lasted from 1936 until March, 1939, the policy of appeasement, shameful term, saw Britain reach the nadir of her humiliation. Mr. Chamberlain has himself avowed a dread of war so great as inevitably to warp the political sense of any person possessing it; nor did Mr. Chamberlain start with much political sense. The post-war reluctance of Britain to assume responsi-

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bility was subsumed in Mr. Chamberlain's mind into a great fear of the unknown; but informing this fear there remained hatred of Russia and a strengthened belief in the Russian menace to capitalism; a weak man's reluctance to trust his own subordinates to obey him, the most childish propensity to self-deception in the face of unpleasant facts, and, most awful example of that self-deception, the plaintively sentimental desire to find human virtues in human monsters.

Appeasement, begun in Mr. Baldwin's own tenure of office, underlay the ghastly farce of non-intervention in Spain. The first need in the Conservative mind seems to have been reconciliation with Italy, since British interests in the Mediterranean were not safe if Italy were hostile; second, there must be reconciliation with Germany—I suppose in order that British interests in the Low Countries might become "safe." As to Spain, certain early actions of Russia suggested the idea that, after all, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy were all capitalist nations together and Russia ought not to be allowed to establish a communist state next door to the Straits of Gibraltar. Efforts to reach an understanding with Italy led to such disgraceful episodes as the so-called Gentleman's Agreement between Britain and Italy on January 2, 1937, and the personal letter of Mr. Chamberlain to Mussolini on July 27, both of these at once followed by

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outrageous breaches of faith on the part of the Italian gentleman.

The second breach was, in fact, so outrageous that action was taken. "Pirate" submarines, which were in truth Italian, began to attack British and other vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. Thereupon British naval vessels were instructed to sink them at sight, and at the Nyon Conference Britain and France with Russian support agreed upon a naval patrol to put an end to the "piracy." This worked like magic and from this moment British advocates of vigor and dignity knew the policy required. Mr. Eden was the British representative at Nyon. At some time earlier in the nonintervention fandango Mr. Eden had begun to manifest grave alarm about Gibraltar's safety, although it is probable that at first he was more disturbed about a Russian than an Italian threat there, strange though that may sound. The old split in the Conservative party was reappearing and Mr. Eden's and Mr. Chamberlain's personal quarrel, which lasts to this day, occurred over Nyon because Mr. Eden desired to name the pirates as Italian, which Russia advocated, while anything pleasing to Russia was *ipso facto* anathema to Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. Eden's growing opposition to appeasement led indirectly to the opening of the next chapter in British policy. In November, 1937, Mr. Cham-

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berlain sent Lord Halifax, who would make a far more amenable foreign secretary than Mr. Eden, to visit Hitler by way of finding out how much Hitler would ask as the price of joining a four-power pact or some such worthless instrument. Whether Halifax talked of Britain's disinterestedness in eastern Europe I do not know, but it would surprise me if he did not. This was the moment at which Mussolini was just adhering to the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Chamberlainites had conceived the view that Hitler's anti-Russian plans would perhaps be the best form of protection for Britain's interests in western Europe and likewise for the capitalist form of society.

From the time of Halifax's visit Hitler began to plan the *Anschluss*, being reassured that Eden had not carried the day with his colleagues. Hitler believed it to be necessary to do this soon in any case, for, if the Spanish war were to come to an end, Mussolini would be free to look after the Brenner once more. How early Mussolini realized Hitler's intentions I do not know; probably he had always regarded the *Anschluss* as inevitable, but had underestimated Hitler's daring and thought Hitler would not move without agreeing upon a *quid pro quo* for Italy. At any rate, on February 10, Mussolini suddenly and urgently suggested an Anglo-Italian reconciliation and offered to withdraw from Spain. Ten days elapsed while Mr. Chamberlain and

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Mr. Eden grappled with each other, and then Mr. Eden resigned. Even then Anglo-Italian negotiations did not move rapidly. Hitler's plans moved much faster: he annexed Austria on March 13. Mussolini proceeded with the Anglo-Italian agreement, although he probably realized long before March 13 that Britain would be quite useless as a support for resisting Germany. The agreement was of value to him only as a lever for securing recognition of Italian conquest of Ethiopia.

It was on March 24, 1938, that Mr. Chamberlain issued his first warning that Britain and France would take a serious view of Germany's tampering with Czechoslovakia, but he showed his true colors by declining a specific guarantee of Czechoslovak integrity. On May 21 Chamberlain learned, simultaneously from Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin and from the French government, that Germany meant business about the annexation of the fortified Czech frontier and with it the Sudeten area. It was on May 23, not, as seems to be commonly thought, early in July, that Chamberlain and his "inner cabinet" decided that Germany, if she pressed the matter as it was evident she would, must be allowed to attain her end. June was a difficult month for Mr. Chamberlain, for, when his views were hinted at in Paris, M. Daladier first tried to frighten him out of them, although M. Bonnet was more pliant. In July the Runciman

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Mission solved most of Mr. Chamberlain's problems. It had to be forced upon M. Beneš, but that act proved in the end the true defeat of Czechoslovakia. If it did not force France to accept the ultimate idea of German annexation of the Czech frontier territory, it did force her to agree to its ostensible purpose, the establishment of autonomy for the Sudetens. That was the true defeat of France. Lord Runciman, I should add, was not taken fully and openly into Mr. Chamberlain's confidence, although he was told that some territorial annexation by Germany was not to be ruled out.

Since the Runciman Mission really settled what was done and published at Munich in September, I beg to draw a veil over August and September, 1938. It is supposed today that Mr. Chamberlain has finally abandoned appeasement, that Hitler's utter breach of confidence in the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia last March alienated Mr. Chamberlain once for all. It is supposed also that the British guarantees of Poland, Rumania, and Greece are guarantees also of Mr. Chamberlain's intention to fight if ever Hitler effects another stroke. I have no faith in Mr. Chamberlain or in the others of his kidney in the Conservative party and I am afraid that, as long as they remain in office, there is a danger of their continuing to act weakly in matters of secondary importance. I am

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confirmed in this fear by the views of Professor Samuel Harper, who has just returned from a visit to Europe, during which he made a very valuable assessment of the situation in Britain. If there is also a danger that Chamberlain will hereafter fail even in first-rate issues, I do not believe the danger is a great one, for the reason that he is now the prisoner of British public opinion and that opinion has reached a strength and clarity which will probably be sufficient to force even a Chamberlain to pursue a policy of vigor and dignity.

I should like now therefore to inquire into the fundamental causes of British policy during these twenty years which I have reviewed; this inquiry will give ultimately the reasons for supposing that the degradation of Britain is ended, that it came to an end a few months ago.

I am far from believing that all is explained by the battering Britain received between 1914 and 1918. British society, and therefore British politics, began to reach a difficult phase of transition quite a number of years before the end of the nineteenth century. While it was in the midst of that transition—and indeed possibly because it was in the midst of that transition—it met the impact of the war of 1914. Out of that war, the transitions still not fully achieved, Britain emerged in a vertiginous gyration. What then was the transition? It was the transition from the leader-

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ship and rule of an aristocracy to a real social democracy with a class basis only in a purely functional sense. The early part of the process which may be very roughly dated from the Third Reform Act of 1884 to 1914 aroused, as was natural and inevitable, a great and terrible disillusionment and a faltering of the national confidence. Then first the fear became general among the old leadership that democracy meant the rule of the average, which must, by mathematical reasoning, be inferior to the rule of the best.

My meaning when I said that the impact of the war came possibly *because* of the transition was as follows. The form of society and rule evolved by the British before the transition—that “liberal” form which has been so ably described by Professor Benedetto Croce—was such a huge success that it had been copied almost all over the world during the nineteenth century. It happened, however, that many countries, such as France and Italy, lacked the eighteenth-century aristocratic tradition which Britain had carried over into the nineteenth century and which had contributed an essential part to British liberal society. Hence in those countries democracy tended to overwhelm liberal society earlier and more rapidly than in Britain. Thus Germany, reaching national unity at a late date—in 1871—and seeking then and thereafter to develop its social and political forms,

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did not bend all its energies toward copying Britain as would have been natural had Britain been forging ahead successfully. Some Germans, it is true, desired to do this, but the Prussian military aristocracy which ruled the country moved instead toward a despotism. And this despotism, by reason of the internal conflicts from which Germany suffered—and most important among them the conflict over whether or not to seek the British liberal form of society—felt impelled to divert the national energies toward things external—toward, that is, colonial conquest, “a place in the sun” and ultimately, half-intentionally, toward the war of 1914.

The question mark remains, of course, for Prussian tradition had a military expansive direction intrinsically, but it is at least possible that, if British institutions had in those crucial decades been more healthy and more attractive the Prussian tradition might have been overborne by the western and southwestern German liberal tradition which was modeled upon that of Britain. Be that as it may, the war came. It was essentially a revolutionary war in that there underlay it the question whether the old British liberal tradition, the new British and indeed universal democratic tradition, or the Prussian military tradition should capture the minds of men. Great calamities spring out of revolutionary conflicts and great calamities

force the pace of history for a time until eventually humanity recovers itself and restores the normal evolutionary pace. The old *Pax Britannica*, a part of the British liberal tradition, broke down in 1914 by way of revolution which burst out of Germany. It was logical, therefore, that in 1919 another act of revolution should follow, a revolutionary break with the past and an attempt to create the millennium by introducing collective responsibility of nations in place of the *Pax Britannica*.

Now revolution, whether it be in international relations or in the form of society, always contains the same danger—the danger of relying upon theory to the exclusion of experience. Never in human history has the revolutionary short cut to perfection proved possible. Theory is of vital importance, but its validity has to be tested at every step by experiment. When Robespierre attempted in a few months to re-create French society according to the theory of Rousseau, he caused the dissolution of French society and the postponement of the normal evolutionary process by twenty years. When the statesmen of Versailles in 1919 attempted to re-create the relationships of the nations according to the theory of Woodrow Wilson, they prepared the way for international anarchy. It is for their successors to find the lost evolutionary path.

And where does that path lie? You will find it by

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beginning to search from the point where evolution was interrupted and revolution began, that is, in 1914, and you cannot do more than find that point and indicate the direction in which to start off anew.

In 1914, then, Western society rested upon the *Pax Britannica*. We must return to the old point of departure as far as the lost twenty-five revolutionary years will permit, and we must at the same time seek to find the new direction in the best experience of the revolution itself. The worst error committed in the name of revolution has been the attempt of Britain to shirk her responsibilities under the collective system of 1919. If Britain would only have accepted her duties under the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance or even under the Geneva Protocol; if she would only have refrained from denying in season and out that the *Pax Britannica* still existed, then some continuity with the past would have been achieved; an evolutionary process might have been restored. And how the other nations, from France and Germany downward, cried out to Britain to do it. The voice of God speaks always to them that have ears to hear!

*Revenons à nos moutons.* In these days the British are the least revolutionary of nations; they had their revolution long ago in the seventeenth century. Yet the war of 1914, striking them in the

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midst of their evolutionary internal transition, created a following for revolution in Britain. One—only one—of the paths of revolution open to the British was to sponsor the less practical and more idealistic features of the new system of security. The Labour party took that path. Perhaps it was easier for the British to support a revolution in the world at large than a revolution in their own island! Even to this day they are still led by the tiny and much debased remnant of their old aristocracy. I suspect that that remnant, namely, the Tories at the head of the Conservative party, have pursued the contemptible foreign policy we have seen because they are so very anxious to inhibit the internal transition of British society. Witness Mr. Chamberlain's fears for capitalism. I think the experience of revolution, namely, Mr. MacDonald's foreign policy, and of its disastrous breakdown in 1933, and the experience of reaction, namely, Conservative foreign policy, and of its far more disastrous breakdown from the time of the Hoare-Laval Peace Plan, has cured Britain of the revolutionary lust.

The actual transition of British society to its new democratic basis is yet far from complete. But it has advanced far enough to provide an answer to the old criticism of democracy as the rule of the average: the answer is in the terms of the old liberal formula of education to raise the level of the

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average. In democratic days we have a broader conception of education than the liberals had; it includes not only formal education but also the education of life. In Hitler's diplomatic victories Britain has been experiencing the education of life in unusually harsh terms. British opinion had, in the Ethiopian affair, a clear example of the trial of the collective system and of its failure. This has been confirmed steadily and ever more forcefully by each success of Hitler's policy. Since even Mr. Chamberlain was revolted by the events of last March, it seems to me that all Britain is through with temporizing and shirking. I would like to quote a passage from a letter I have received from Professor Charles K. Webster. He says: "You entirely misconceive your country if you think it is not to resist an attempt to obtain hegemony in Europe. It is far more united in its purpose than at any previous time including the Napoleonic time when as you know there was a strong opposition. The 'spirit' of England so far from 'sinking' is much stronger than it has been in my lifetime."

If, then, we may expect the British to fight and otherwise resist the seeker after a Continental hegemony, evidently the moment has in fact arrived to turn back to that point in 1914 at which the world left the evolutionary path for revolution. We should look for restoration of the *Pax Britannica*. But the exact point is not that of August, 1914;

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under cover of revolution some changes have been made which cannot and should not be reversed. The world of 1939 is not the world of 1914. Great Germany today is far greater than William II's Germany. The English Channel is even narrower by 1939 than by 1914 measurements of speed and distance. It is not a bulwark for Britain today as it once was. Even between 1914 and 1918 German submarines greatly reduced the protective value of the channel to Britain. Today submarines are a greater menace than they were between 1914 and 1918, and aviation also can today be used against Britain's shipping; it was far too primitive to be of real importance for that purpose in the last war. I venture to prophesy that, if there is another war in Europe, air warfare will be of greatest importance as an extension of German submarine warfare upon Britain's sea-borne commerce.

These things the British know. For that reason Britain's reluctance to play her traditional role during these last revolutionary years must not be wholly discounted. Pathologically exaggerated though it was, there was some real reason for it. The upshot is, that while we ought to expect Britain to restore the *Pax Britannica* as far as she can, we should be fools to expect her to be able to shoulder all her old responsibilities again. The peace of Europe is for Britain a greater burden than it was. If Britain is able—and I think she is able and am

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sure she will try—to control Europe once more; if she can maintain her leadership in the Mediterranean, Africa, the Near and Middle East; if she can restore the *Pax Britannica* in these regions, someone else must be responsible for the rest of the world. And that, ladies and gentlemen, means the United States. You must be prepared to look after the Pacific, north, south, east, and west. You must demand that Canada, Australia, and New Zealand co-operate with you in the task. You have a right to do so; those nations have had an easy life almost since their birth. Britain will continue to help you when and as much as she can, but you are leaders now. The United States and Britain together may be able to build in time the idealist's system of collective security upon a basis of their own power instead of upon the 1919 basis of sand.

I regard the Monroe Doctrine as the logical result of the revolutionary attack upon British power made between the years 1775 and 1815. To the world as a whole the most important result of those forty years was, in my submission, Britain's abandonment of her leadership in the Western Hemisphere. When a few years later the United States took up the abandoned leadership with the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, it was shown that all the world was to remain an Anglo-Saxon world. If it is to remain so still after the revolutionary attack made upon British power on this second

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occasion from 1914 down until today, the United States must extend the Monroe Doctrine. Call it, if you like, the *Pax Americana*. Finally let me say this: the United States is a nation not far off three times the size of Britain and potentially far wealthier. When two nations of such dissimilar strength are partners in world-leadership, it is right and natural that the greater one of the two should be the senior partner. The United States may safely expect Britain to return now to her duties as far as she can. Have faith that the day of appeasement is over. But remember that facts are facts. Britain will have her work cut out to maintain her leadership from the Baltic to the Cape of Good Hope, from Gibraltar to Ceylon. In the last resort the United States may have to help her there in her own territory. The United States must now assume world-leadership.



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